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THE INTERSECTION OF FACTUAL CAUSATION
AND DAMAGES
Michael D. Green*
Some of the most intriguing brain teasers in tort law involve the
valuation of damages for harm arising from wrongfully inflicted
injury to person or property.'
INTRODUCTION
I first became interested in the subject of this paper while working
on factual causation for the Restatement (Third) of Torts. In that pro-
cess, my co-reporter, Bill Powers, and I kept coming across difficult
questions relating to how much of an injury should be attributed to a
tortfeasor. These are the issues to which David Fischer adverts in the
above passage. Thus, imagine a person injured by a tortfeasor and
that person suffers a fifty percent diminution in work capacity. Later,
the person independently develops a disease that will, in a few years,
prevent her from working at all.2 To what measure of damages is the
plaintiff entitled from the tortfeasor? Does it matter if the second
disease results from tortious, rather than innocent, conduct? While
this particular example involves earnings capacity as the harm, the
same sorts of issues arise for the harm of interest at this Symposium-
noneconomic harm.3 Consider a pregnant woman who is injured in a
* Williams Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. Numerous conversa-
tions over the past decade with Bill Powers, my co-reporter of two portions of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, have informed the views I express in this paper. Bill, despite heroic efforts, has
not been able to eliminate all of my errors. David Fischer has been helpful both in his work in
this area and in comments he provided on a prior draft. I learned a lot during an opportunity to
discuss this paper with the New York torts group and with my colleagues at Wake Forest at a
development seminar. John Vermitsky has provided much appreciated research assistance.
1. David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 66 TENN. L. REV.
1127, 1127 (1999).
2. I borrow here from the British case of Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd., [19821 A.C. 794
(H.L.). See also Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 234 N.W.2d 332, 344 (Wis.
1975) (finding that unrelated stroke suffered before trial that caused loss of earnings capacity
barred recovery for future earnings).
3. See, e.g., Abernathy v. Superior Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963, 973 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
that pre-existing back condition could be considered by jury in awarding pain and suffering dam-
ages for subsequent injury to back because subsequent injury may just have accelerated pain that
plaintiff would otherwise suffer from pre-existing condition); Henderson v. United States, 328
F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1964); Kegel v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 790, 796 (D. Mont. 1968) (reducing
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train crash that results in the premature cesarean section delivery of
her baby, born with several deficits due to prematurity. May the rail-
road reduce the pain and suffering damages for which it would other-
wise be liable by pointing to the pain and suffering of labor at full
term that the plaintiff would have incurred? 4 Consider also a defen-
dant who negligently runs into a pedestrian, seriously injuring the pe-
destrian's foot and leg and causing severe and permanent pain. Some
time later, the victim is in another accident that requires the amputa-
tion of his leg. Can the first defendant obtain a reduction in the pain
and suffering damages for which she would have been liable if the
second accident had not occurred? 5 Thus the inquiry in which I en-
gage in this paper is applicable to noneconomic damages, but not ex-
clusively so.
These are hard questions-harder than a number of difficult ques-
tions we puzzled over involving multiple sufficient causes, especially
plaintiff's damages for pain and suffering due to herniated disk based on pre-existing condition
and time when pre-existing condition would have produced same harm); Fischer, supra note 1, at
1131 ("Duplicated harm also occurs with non-economic losses such as pain, suffering, and mental
distress.").
4. The issue is suggested by, but not raised in, Powers v. Campbell, 442 P.2d 792, 794-95 (N.M.
1968). Contrary to my conclusions later in this paper, most courts do not provide defendants a
credit for the pain and suffering a mother would incur at term when the defendant causes a
miscarriage. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 1144 n.92. I agree with Professor Fischer that whatever
is happening in these cases is different from the standard treatment for duplicated harm. Per-
haps the pain of labor, while real pain (as I am assured by my wife and other mothers), is exper-
ienced under circumstances that make it far less traumatic and harmful than if it occurred in a
different context. Perhaps anticipated pain that occurs in the midst of a glorious event such as
an ordinary birth is neither cognizable as harm nor a basis for discount as harm avoided. That
the outcome depends, as Prosser suggests, on the amount of time before the due date that the
miscarriage occurs is implausible and unpersuasive. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 353 n.78 (5th ed. 1984). In every case, we can be reasonably
sure (certainly beyond the fifty percent preponderance threshold) that, in the absence of the
miscarriage, the woman would have experienced such pain. About two-thirds of all recognized
pregnancies result in a live birth; only fifteen to twenty percent are terminated by miscarriage or
stillbirth. See S. VENTURA ET AL., CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL, TRENDS IN PREGNANCIES AND
PREGNANCY RATES BY OUTCOME: ESTIMATES FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1976-96, at 25 (2000).
Note that the harm avoided and for which the defendant seeks a credit was a consequence of
the defendant's tort. This, then, overlaps with the narrower field of conferral of a benefit and
whether a defendant can obtain a credit for such. Courts have been more reluctant to adjust
damages in this specific instance. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979) (noting
that benefit conferred by defendant is relevant to damages only "to the extent that this is equita-
ble"). See also infra note 12.
5. I borrow from another British case, Baker v. Willoughby, [1970] A.C. 467 (H.L. 1969). See
also Jurney v. Lubeznik, 218 N.E.2d 799 (Il1. App. Ct. 1966). The issue arose in Baker, but the
extent of damage for post amputation pain and suffering was so small as not to require any
adjustment. See Harvey McGregor, Variations on an Engima, 33 MOD. L. REV. 378, 383-84
(1970).
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when negligent omissions constituted those sufficient causes.6 Dead-
lines and perhaps our limited ability to grapple over conundrums as
difficult as these led me to argue that the problem was not one of
causation but damages. 7 We could postpone damages issues to a fu-
ture torts Restatement project and thus avoid having to confront and
resolve these issues. Despite Bill Powers's discomfort with that route
and his arguments to me that we were neglecting a causal matter, that
is exactly what we did.8 This was the American Law Institute's (ALI)
analog of the dismissal in a law review article that "this issue is beyond
the scope of this article."
Lest I sound cavalier about this matter, I want to acknowledge that
the matter is of some importance. In his influential article on causa-
tion and loss of a chance, Professor King urged that for the sake of
analytical clarity, the idea of causation be kept distinct from the idea
of damages and its component inquiry, identification of the harm.9
For a variety of reasons he demonstrates in the lost chance context,
such clarity is important to working through a variety of difficult
problems at the intersection of these subjects. 10 I have even more ap-
preciation for Professor King's advice, having observed the difficulties
created by coupling factual cause and limitations on liability as legal
cause or proximate cause.11
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. i (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
7. By "damages" I mean identification of the harm that will require valuation by the
factfinder. In determining damages, there are at least three steps required to determine an ap-
propriate monetary award: (1) identifying the detriment suffered by the plaintiff, (2) determin-
ing whether the detriment suffered by the plaintiff is a compensable harm, and (3) determining
the value of the harm. It is the first aspect that I address in this paper.
8. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. k, § 27
illus. 6, § 31 cmt. c (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
9. See Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving
Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1353-54 (1981).
10. For an explanation of the reasons for having different elements for a cause of action, see
W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REV. 921 (2005).
11. The confusion, inefficiency, and opacity created by the failure to separate and distinguish
two quite different problems has long been appreciated and documented. See VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 89 (3d ed. 1994) ("One of the great breakthroughs in
analysis of proximate cause was accomplished when courts and legal scholars attempted to iso-
late problems of causation in fact from proximate cause."); Laurence H. Eldredge, Culpable
Intervention as Superseding Cause, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 121, 123 (1937) ("All too frequently the
language of opinions serves only to obscure the real problem by discussing the two separate
questions as one ...."); Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REV. 582, 603, 606-07
(1935) (criticizing Restatement of Tort's failure to keep factual cause and proximate cause dis-
tinct); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Dixie Drive It Yourself Versus American Beverage Com-
pany, 30 LA. L. REV. 363, 370, 377 (1970); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9
STAN. L. REV. 60, 97 (1956); Charles B. Mikell, Jury Instructions and Proximate Cause: An Un-
certain Trumpet in Georgia, 27 GA. ST. B.J. 60, 64 (1990) ("The factual issue of cause in fact
2006]
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I am pleased that this Symposium has afforded me the opportunity
to revisit these questions, which we deferred at the time. Having left
these questions to a future Restatement, I have the luxury of rethink-
ing whether we made the right choice about where they belong with-
out much concern for the proper substantive resolution of them. 12
Someone else will assume responsibility for assisting the ALI to work
through these questions at the intersection of causation and damages.
Moreover, this Symposium affords me the possibility of explaining to
my friend and long-time collaborator that deferring these matters was
proper. Having engaged in such efforts in the past, I do not hold great
optimism that I will succeed. My efforts were given a boost, however,
while doing some preliminary research for this paper. I came across a
promising opinion in a recent torts casebook that was published after
we chose deferral. As the authors of that casebook put it: "[T]he issue
... is often thought to present a conundrum as to actual causation....
Might [it] better be understood as raising an issue of damages-that is,
the amount of compensation that, in fairness, ought to be paid to the
victim (or his estate) by the tortfeasor?" 1 3
should rigorously be separated from the policy decision about proximate cause."); Walter
Probert, Causation in the Negligence Jargon: A Plea for Balanced "Realism," 18 U. FLA. L. REV.
369, 372 (1965). Before he became the Reporter for the Restatement Second of Torts, Dean
Prosser expressed similar views:
A decision upon one issue, and the language used in it, has no bearing on any other.
The confusion which surrounds the whole subject results very largely from carrying
over such language to another entirely unrelated problem. The first essential step in
any clarification of "proximate cause" is a separation of the issues.
William L. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L. REV. 369, 425 (1950). See also
Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54
VAND. L. REV. 941, 945, 971, 978 (2001); Richard W. Wright, Once More into the Bramble Bush:
Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1080
(2001).
12. Thus, I do not address a matter that is often discussed with the issues I propose to examine
in this paper: how to account for the defendant conferring a benefit on the plaintiff at the same
time that the plaintiff is injured by the defendant. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920
(1979). That question is dealt with under the rubric of damages and raises concerns that overlap
with those identified above. See id. at illus. 8. Tension between the duplicated harm rule, which
I do address, and the benefit rule is minimized when the latter permits a credit where the inter-
ests affected are the same, but denies a credit where the interests are different (and, thus, there
is not duplicated harm). Thus, I do not think the fact that proper accounting for benefits is dealt
with as a matter of damages contributes significantly one way or the other to the larger Powers-
Green debate I address herein. I also suspect that the matter of conferring a benefit does not
arise very often when the defendant's tort involves physical harm, the subject of the Third Re-
statement project that generated our interest in the proper home for the issues we deferred.
13. JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 257 (2004). I
also find support in the work of David Robertson, who treats the issue as one of damages. See
David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1794 (1997).
Ironically, I am inclined to think that Professor Robertson is overbroad in what he characterizes
as damages issues. For him, so long as the defendant caused some of the harm complained of by
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I must confess that the subject of this paper is at the periphery of
the subject matter of this Symposium. Most of the participants here
are going to delve deeply into the murky waters of pain and suffering,
whether and why we should recognize that as a compensable loss, and
how to value it when it occurs. My topic bears on that question be-
cause of the need to identify the existence and length of noneconomic
damages that are eligible for compensation. My trepidation at balanc-
ing on the margin is enhanced by the realization that if I should con-
clude that Bill Powers is correct that this is a matter of causation, I
have analyzed myself right out of the subject matter of this confer-
ence. That acknowledgment should satisfy my ethical obligation of
full disclosure of the biases and external influences with which I come
to this inquiry.
After working through this problem, I am now inclined to believe
several things: (1) in an unimportant way, the problem is one of both
causation and damages (or harm, as I characterize the identification of
the detriment that must be valued to determine damages); (2) that the
problem of determining the appropriate damages in cases such as I set
forth initially is one best not dealt with as a matter of factual cause; (3)
that the most likely doctrinal arena in which to place those problems
is damages; and (4) the law that emerges in determining these dam-
ages awards provides insight into the errors of addressing these mat-
ters as one of causation. At the end of the day, I find myself pleased
to have prevailed in my disagreement with Bill Powers on the matter
of whether we appropriately deferred. I must confess, however, that
my record with him is no better for it because of a victory he can now
claim on a matter that emerges later in this paper, but that I will defer
identifying and discussing for as long as I can.
II. THE NECESSITY OF CAUSATION AND HARM IDENTIFICATION
In a foundational sense, both causation and harm identification are
required in the determination of damages that might be described as
overdetermined or duplicated. The "duplicated" term is applicable to
cases like one described earlier in which the victim's fifty percent dim-
inution in work capacity caused by a tortfeasor is duplicated some
time later when an independent event (disease) produced the same
harm (and more). Thus, from the time that the disease disabled the
plaintiff, both the tortious harm and the disease caused the duplicated
plaintiff, the remaining issues are damages. I would think that so long as there is evidence that
emerges that some of the harm suffered by plaintiff was not caused by defendant, there is a
causal issue. In addition, whether and when to shift the burden of proof on causation is not a
matter of damages law.
2006]
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harm of a fifty percent diminution in work capacity. By contrast,
"overdetermined harm" occurs when two independently sufficient
causes concur at the same time and each is capable of causing harm. 14
Duplicated harms can be understood as a special conceptual case of
overdetermined harms-while they do not occur at the same time,
they share the characteristic of multiple causes producing overlapping
or duplicated harm, although not at the same time.1 5
No damages scheme can proceed without an identification of the
harm for which damages are awarded.16 At the same time, causation
is critical because it limits the harm that qualifies for compensation.
Aside from the necessity of both, there is an interactive quality to the
two concepts, as explained below.
In order to make any causal inquiry, the inquiry must be framed. 17
That framing requires identifying the act or event that is of interest as
a potential cause and the legally cognizable outcome or harm to which
the inquiry is addressed. Only after those two items are specified can
we engage in a causal inquiry: counterfactually by employing the fa-
miliar but-for standard or by supplementing it with an appropriate test
for overdetermined harms. Specifying the harm is a distinctly norma-
tive act. In personal injury cases it may often not seem so, but when
we think about whether increased risk, pleural plaque (a consequence
of asbestos exposure that is revealed in abnormal x-rays without any
clinical symptomology), or stand-alone emotional disturbance consti-
tute harms, we readily appreciate the normativity involved in charac-
14. I refer to those causes that produce overdetermined harm as multiple sufficient causes or
concurring causes, the latter of which I also use to refer to causes that are responsible for dupli-
cated harm. Multiple sufficient causes is a more convenient shorthand for the NESS (necessary
element of a sufficient set) test. When a cause is not sufficient along with other background
causes to cause the harm, as in the case of a partial dose of poison, resort to the NESS test is
required. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. f
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
15. As explained later, labeling the forces responsible for duplicated harm as causes is prob-
lematic, indeed, often incorrect. For now, it is useful in understanding the concept of duplicated
harm.
16. As Stephen Perry put it: "[A]n award of damages is often intended to compensate for
harm; if we do not know something about the nature of harm, we cannot fully understand the
nature of at least this type of compensation." Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactu-
als, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1283, 1283 (2003).
17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. f (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). See also Robertson, supra note 13, at 1769. Tony Honor6 makes
this point along with the observation that, for its purposes, law imposes a particular form of
framing that addresses the act and harm that are specified by the law as the ones of interest. See
TONY HONOR8, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 100, 106 (1999) (arguing that "[t]he inquiry is into
whether certain faulty conduct (or risk-creating conduct entailing strict liability) caused certain
harm").
[Vol. 55:671
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terizing what counts as harm.' 8 Thus, Professor King's seminal article
urges recognition of loss of a chance of a benefit, such as cure of a
terminal disease, as compensable harm. King contends that the re-
form would reconceptualize the harm from the classical detrimental
outcome to the foregone probability of avoiding that outcome,
thereby modifying the damages recoverable while holding constant
the requirement of factual causation and its definition.' 9
III. THE ROLE OF HARM IDENTIFICATION
I also contend, uncontroversially I expect, that harm of the sort ad-
dressed at this Symposium has a time dimension: a plaintiff who suf-
fers some magnitude of pain and suffering for a longer period than
another plaintiff is entitled to a greater award of damages. The same
is true in death cases. For those with a consortium claim, the loss is, in
part, a function of the amount of time that the survivor has lost with
the deceased relation. Whether or not the defendant's lawyer decides
to abjure out of sensitivity, the lawyer should be able to argue that the
widower of a seventy-five-year-old decedent has suffered a considera-
bly diminished harm than would have been the case if the decedent
were twenty-five. Similarly, in the handful of jurisdictions that permit
recovery for hedonic damages in death cases, the lost enjoyment is a
function of the amount of time that the decedent was deprived of the
pleasures of life.20
There are a number of contemporary controversies in tort law that
illustrate the role of harm identification in determining damages.
Once again, one such controversy concerns time and the possibility of
disease acceleration that arises in the toxic substances context.21 Since
the remand of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. to the
18. See John C. P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1315, 1317-21 (2003) (characterizing Stephen Perry's claims).
19. See King, supra note 9.
20. Only a few jurisdictions have affirmatively decided that hedonic damages are recoverable
in death cases. See Choctaw Maid Farms, Inc. v. Hailey, 822 So. 2d 911, 928-31 (Miss. 2002)
(Cobb, J., dissenting in part); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The
Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1059-60 n.107 (2004). The New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court was the most direct in addressing the role of time, as the statute authorizing
suit contained language permitting damages based on "the probable duration of [the deceased's]
life but for the injury." See Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 733 A.2d 394, 399
(N.H. 1999) (quoting the state wrongful death statute). During Britain's experiment with he-
donic damages, the House of Lords acknowledged the role of time lost. See Benham v. Gam-
bling, [1941] 1 Eng. Rep. 7, 12-13 (H.L.).
21. For a philosopher's claim that defining harm by reference to the time by which that harm
was accelerated assists in unraveling causal inquiries, see L.A. Paul, Keeping Track of the Time:
Emending the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation, 58 ANALYSIS 191, 193 (1998).
2006]
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Ninth Circuit,2 2 there has been conflict over whether a plaintiff can
prevail if the epidemiologic studies employed to demonstrate the exis-
tence of general causation do not reveal a doubling of disease (a rela-
tive risk of two reflects a doubling of disease) in the population
exposed to an alleged toxin.23 The idea behind this doubling require-
ment is that unless the toxic agent increases the incidence of disease in
a group exposed to the agent by something greater than one hundred
percent, no member of that group who contracts the disease can
"more likely than not" pin his or her disease on exposure to the agent.
This oversimplifies the claim, but in recent years a number of scien-
tists have criticized a threshold requirement of a doubling of risk on
the ground that it fails to account for the possibility that the agent
may, rather than causing a disease in a person who otherwise never
would have contracted it, merely accelerate the time at which the dis-
ease occurs. 24 If that were the case, then relative risks less than two
may reflect a majority of exposed persons having their disease acceler-
ated in time and support recovery for those claimants out for damages
that reflect the acceleration. The difficulty with this claim is that there
may be no evidence available to determine whether the biology and
development of the disease is of the accelerative variety-perhaps be-
cause victims already have a genetic predisposition that merely re-
quires a source to actuate the disease-or of the generative variety.
If there were cases in which such evidence existed,25 we might well
want to recognize the acceleration of the onset of a disease and pro-
vide the plaintiff with damages reflecting that harm. A plaintiff could
22. 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate a minimum rela-
tive risk of 2.0).
23. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(4)
reporters' note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); Russellyn S. Carruth & Bernard D. Gold-
stein, Relative Risk Greater Than Two in Proof of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 41
JURIMETRICS J. 195 (2001).
24. See Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Conceptual Problems in the Definition and
Interpretation of Attributable Fractions, 128 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1185 (1988); Sander Green-
land & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40
JURIMETRICS J. 321 (2000); James Robins, Should Compensation Schemes Be Based on the
Probability of Causation or Expected Years of Life Lost?, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 537 (2004); Ofer
Shpilberg et al., The Next Stage: Molecular Epidemiology, 50 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 633,
637 (1997) ("[A] 1.5-fold relative risk may be composed of a 5-fold risk in 10% of the popula-
tion, and a 1.1-fold risk in the remaining 90%, or a 2-fold risk in 25% and a 1.1-fold for 75%, or a
1.5-fold risk for the entire population.").
25. For examples of studies whose results suggest acceleration, see James L. Gale et al., Risk
of Serious Acute Neurological Illness After Immunization With Diphtheria-Tetanus-Pertussis Vac-
cine, 271 JAMA 37, 41 (1994) (discussing finding in another study that risk of seizures following
DPT vaccine administration were significantly higher within six days of administration; after
twenty-eight days, the incidence had dropped to normal); Brad A. Racette et al., Welding-Re-
lated Parkinsonism: Clinical Features, Treatment, and Pathophysiology, 56 NEUROLOGY 8, 12
[Vol. 55:671
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recover for pain and suffering and lost earnings capacity, but only for
the period of time that reflects the acceleration of the disease caused
by the toxic agent. Thus the modified harm that reflects acceleration
becomes the basis for an award of damages.
A better recognized area of acceleration occurs in what are collo-
quially known as "thin-skull plaintiff cases." The plaintiff with a pre-
disposition to suffer more severe or different types of harm than might
reasonably be foreseeable may nevertheless recover for that harm.2 6
Yet that plaintiff's predisposition will reduce the damages to which he
or she would otherwise be entitled if the factfinder determines that
the harm would have occurred due to the predisposition at some later
time-defendants only pay for the accelerated harm that they cause
thin-skull plaintiffs.27
Another arena in which recharacterization of the harm plays a role
is in lost chance cases. For example, a physician's failure to diagnose
or refer a patient deprives that patient of an opportunity for successful
treatment. A number of courts have reconceptualized the harm suf-
fered as being the lost chance, which is the probability of successful
treatment lost due to the missed or delayed diagnosis. Thus the harm
to be compensated becomes the damages that would be awarded for
the disease or illness, discounted by the probability that the harm
could have been avoided if there had been no negligence. 28
(2001) (stating that the authors "believe that welding exposure acts as an accelerant to cause
[Parkinson's Disease]").
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 31 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
27. See Maurer v. United States, 668 F.2d 98, 100 (2d Cir. 1981). The court noted that:
[w]hen a plaintiff has a preexisting condition that would inevitably worsen, a defendant
causing subsequent injury is entitled to have the plaintiff's damages discounted to re-
flect the proportion of damages that would have been suffered even in the absence of
the subsequent injury, but the burden of proof in such cases is upon the defendant to
prove the extent of the damages that the preexisting condition would inevitably have
caused.
Id.
See also Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1970); Kegel v. United States, 289
F. Supp. 790, 796 (D. Mont. 1968) (deciding a Federal Tort Claims Act case); Dorsey v.
Muilenburg, 345 S.W.2d 134, 142 (Mo. 1961); McCahill v. New York Transp. Co., 94 N.E. 616,
617 (N.Y. 1911); Haws v. Bullock, 592 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Smith v. Leech
Brain & Co. Ltd., [1962] 2 Q.B. 405, 416. The Queen's Bench reporter then noted that the court
"must make a substantial reduction from the figure [for dependent damages] because of the fact
that the plaintiff's husband might have developed cancer even if he had not suffered the burn
[due to the defendant's tortious act that caused his cancer]."
28. This reconceptualized harm-a lost probability of cure-is not as pure a reconceptualiza-
tion as might appear. Before a plaintiff is going to be able to recover for this harm, he or she is
going to have to suffer the ultimate harm-whatever outcome successful treatment would have
avoided. The plaintiff who, despite being deprived of a better chance of successful treatment,
nevertheless beats the odds and is cured will not be able to recover for the greater lost chance
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These are cases that require no modification of normal causal con-
cepts, create no stress for the typical but-for causation standard, and,
while requiring modification of customary tort principles, exclusively
employ harm identification with which to accomplish that purpose.
Thus, the lost chance cases properly belong to damages law, not cau-
sation.29 Similarly, if acceleration of disease exists, it requires adjust-
ment at the harm identification point, not with causal concepts, as
does acceleration in the thin-skull context. Moreover, I take these ob-
servations as reflecting a preliminary success for my position on
whether causation or damages law is at the core of the problems iden-
tified at the outset. Let us see if causation can make a comeback.
IV. THE ROLE OF CAUSATION
I begin with what I believe is an uncontroversial assertion: One can-
not cause an outcome that has already occurred.30 If I stop talking at
this moment, self-conscious that nothing I have to say is worthwhile,
and subsequently Steve Landsman yells, "Shut-up, Green, we've
heard enough," Landsman's uncivil and unkind, if accurate, statement
is not a cause of my silence. Landsman is not liable for silencing me
even if there is an action in tort for justifiable silencing; he simply has
not caused any of my silence, although he may cause me considerable
emotional disturbance. Similarly, a negligent automobile driver who
runs over a person who is lying on the pavement, already dead, has
not caused that person's death or, indeed, any harm to that person.31
that he or she suffered. Perhaps the answer is that while he or she suffered a lost chance, that
lost chance caused no monetary damages. This answer assumes that the treatment was not any
more costly or lengthy because of the delay in diagnosis.
29. There are courts that have permitted the jury to find causation for the entirety of the
plaintiff's harm. See David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 605, 641 n.193 (2001) (providing case citations). Some flatly misinterpret § 323(a) of the
Second Restatement to support that outcome. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 178, at
435 n.3 (2000) (citing such cases). Others employ the "substantial factor" standard contained in
the Second Restatement to permit the jury to find causation on something less than the sine qua
non standard based on a preponderance of the evidence; in my view, this once again misuses the
substantial factor concept. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 26 cmt. j & reporters' note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
30. No serious controversy exists over the proposition that a tortious act that occurs after
harm has already happened cannot be a factual cause of the harm. For a review of the cases and
scholarship, see DOBBS, supra note 29, at 416; KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 52, at 353; Fischer,
supra note 1, at 1149; see also H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 239 (2d
ed. 1985); King, supra note 9, at 1357-58; Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics of Causal Interven-
tion, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827, 860-61 (2000); Stapleton, supra note 11, at 960 n.43; Glanville Wil-
liams, Causation in the Law, 1961 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62, 69, 72; Wright, supra note 11, at 1098-99;
Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1795 (1985).
31. See Saden v. Kirby, 660 So. 2d 423 (La. 1995); HART & HONOR8, supra note 30, at 239;
King, supra note 9, at 1357-58; Stapleton, supra note 11, at 960 n.43; Williams, supra note 30, at
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This conclusion is reflected in the concept of causal "preemption." As
Tony Honor6 put it: "[I]t seems clear that it is impossible to cause an
event that has already occurred. One can flog a dead horse but not
kill it. ''32
Let me switch weapons of singular destruction and move to guns. If
two hunters fire negligently at their quarry and their bullets arrive in
the plaintiff's eye at the same moment, is either one a cause of the
plaintiff's harm? This is just a variation on the familiar "two fires"
hypothetical 33 that requires some consideration of the role of the sine
qua non test for factual cause. Each hunter is a cause of the harm and
liable for the full extent of damages suffered by the victim. Sine qua
non will not do here, but there is no doubt that instinctively, 34 ration-
ally, and normatively, we are entirely comfortable describing each
hunter's action as a cause of the victim's harm and holding each liable
for damages affiliated with the loss of an eye.35
69, 72; Wright, supra note 11, at 1098-99; Wright, supra note 30, at 1795. Professor Moore,
perhaps uniquely, conceptualizes preemptive causes as intervening causes, an aspect of proxi-
mate cause rather than factual cause. See Moore, supra note 30, at 846. I fail to see the attrac-
tion of employing a normative-judgmental standard for a proposition that falls well within the
definition of causation. For a cause to produce an effect the cause must precede the effect. With
the outcome having already occurred, the preempted force cannot be a factual cause of harm-
there is no reason to move to the murky world of proximate cause and intervening acts to re-
solve this matter.
32. HONORS, supra note 17, at 113.
33. The familiar "two-fires hypothetical" is not a hypothetical. All three of the early classic
cases that addressed the question of overdetermined harm involved multiple sufficient fires. See
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920); Kingston v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927); Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry.
Co., 74 N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898). Railroads in close proximity to their neighbors had a troubling
propensity to cause fires.
34. See Barbara A. Spellman & Alexandra Kincannon, The Relation Between Counterfactual
("But For") and Causal Reasoning: Experimental Findings and Implications for Jurors' Decisions,
64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 241 (2001) (finding that subjects reasoned that multiple sufficient
causes were causes even without instructions on what constituted causation).
35. Professors Hart and Honor6, two of the leading legal academics to examine causation, do
not even attempt a justification for finding multiple sufficient forces as causes, merely observing:
"It is perfectly intelligible that in these circumstances a legal system should treat each as the
cause rather than neither, as the sine qua non test would require." HART & HONORP, supra
note 30, at 124. Modern caselaw is consistent. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d
381, 388 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d Cir. 1969) (apply-
ing Connecticut law); Vincent v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847 (Alaska 1993); Nazareno
v. Urie, 638 P.2d 671, 677 (Alaska 1981); Thomsen v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 45 Cal. Rptr.
642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965); Stahl v. Metro. Dade County, 438 So. 2d 14, 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (dicta); Gerst v. Marshall, 549 N.W.2d 810 (Iowa 1996) (dicta); LeJeune v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 365 So. 2d 471, 475-77 (La. 1978); Augustine v. Cross, No. 92-01417, 1995 WL 808900
(Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 1995) (dicta); Heer v. State, 432 N.W.2d 559, 567 (S.D. 1988); Waste
Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15 S.W.3d 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
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Legal commentators have offered a number of explanations why
each of the hunters' tortious acts is a cause of the harm.36 Some at-
tempt to retain the but-for standard, yet they manipulate it in a way
that reaches the desired outcome. Thus, but for the tortious acts of
the two hunters, the victim would still have his eye. 37 Yes, but there is
a certain, arbitrary quality to this rationale that is troubling. But for
the torts of one of the hunters and another hunter on the other side of
the county who fired carelessly and hit nothing, the victim would not
have suffered harm.38 Richard Wright has popularized a different ap-
proach that has its genesis, at least in the legal arena, in the work of H.
L. A. Hart and Tony Honor6-the necessary element of a sufficient
set (NESS) test.39 Thus, an act or omission is a cause if it is a neces-
sary element of a set of factors sufficient for the harm to occur. The
attractiveness of Wright's formulation in dealing with multiple suffi-
cient causes is its recognition that while but-for is a definition of cau-
sation, it is not the exclusive definition and can be supplemented when
there are multiple sufficient causes. 40
So far, causation is up to the task of appropriately identifying the
harm for which a victim is entitled to damages. Causation becomes
stressed, however, with a modest modification of the two hunters hy-
36. See ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLI-
GENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES 16-17 (1961) (advocating describing the harm with enough
specificity that it includes the existence of both sufficient causes, thereby preserving the but-for
test); KEETON ET AL., supra note 4. at 268-69 (arguing for treating the two parties responsible
for the multiple sufficient causes together as one, when but-for causation would be inadequate);
J. L. MACKIE, THE CEMENT OF THE UNIVERSE: A STUDY OF CAUSATION 265-66 (L. Jonathan
Cohen ed., 1974) (stating that both causes considered together are a but-for cause of the harm);
Stapleton, supra note 11, at 968 (upholding the "dignity of the law" requires modifying the but-
for standard).
37. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, at 268-69; MACKIE, supra note 36, at 265-66.
38. See Wright, supra note 30, at 1780-81.
39. See HART & HONORE, supra note 30.
40. I use the term "multiple sufficient causes" for simplicity, although Professor Wright's for-
mulation is more precise. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL
HARM § 27 cmt. f (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005). The difference matters when the tortious
act is not, by itself, sufficient with other "background" causes to constitute all that is necessary to
produce the harm. Thus, if six asbestos defendants each contribute one-fifth of the dose of
asbestos required to cause lung cancer, none, along with background causes, is a sufficient cause
of the lung cancer. This is where the NESS concept provides greater precision in identifying
each of the defendants' contributions as a necessary element of a sufficient set of five doses for
lung cancer to occur.
I am grateful to Jane Stapleton who pointed out to me that we can employ but-for as a nonex-
elusive definition of causation supplemented with the multiple sufficient cause standard. See
also Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation and Counterfactual Baselines, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1181, 1257 (2003) (concluding that but-for is not necessary for causation because
of overdetermined-harm cases). The NESS standard has the elegance of encompassing both but-
for and a supplementary standard for multiple sufficient causes, but is cumbersome for ordinary
usage when the straightforward but-for standard is up to the task.
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pothetical. Suppose that one of them acts nontortiously or that the
other sufficient cause is one of natural origin.
The instance of concurring innocent and tortious causes has a long
and controversial history. The late nineteenth and early twentieth
century cases split on this question. 41 Commentators at the time had
conflicting views on the matter but their arguments resembled smoke
and mirrors rather than anything persuasive in resolving the ques-
tion.42 For reasons that I have not been able to determine and will
have to leave to the future, Francis Bohlen,43 the Reporter for the
Restatement of Torts, drafted that document so as to impose liability
on the defendant whose tortious act concurred with a sufficient inno-
cent cause. 44 Dean Prosser reported that this standard, enunciated in
41. See supra note 33.
42. Compare ARCHIBALD ROBINSON WATSON, DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES § 61, at
62-64 (1901) (criticizing the Cook case and stating, without reason or citation, that there should
be liability for multiple sufficient causes, even when one is innocent), and Charles E. Carpenter,
Concurrent Causation, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 941, 948 (1935) (advocating that defendant's act is a
factual cause and that the but-for test is not the exclusive means for determining factual causes),
with Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924), Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple
Causation and Damage, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1127 (1934) (arguing such a defendant's act should
not be held a cause of plaintiff's harm because plaintiff would have suffered the harm in any
case), and Williams, supra note 30, at 76. In his treatise on damages, Professor McCormick split
the difference, proclaiming in the text that both causes had to be of tortious origin and citing
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920), the case that held
liability should be imposed in the event of concurring innocent and tortious causes, in the sup-
porting footnote. See CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 74, at
263 n.5 (1935). Peaslee's article stands as an exception to the criticism of the commentators
contained in the text. Rereading his article while writing this paper made me appreciate that he
had a persuasive ground for treating concurring tortious and innocent causes differently from
two concurring tortious causes. Peaslee's article, unfortunately, was published two years after
Bohlen first drafted the provisions that became § 432(2) and comment d in the Restatement of
Torts and too late (I infer) for Bohlen to take account of it.
43. Bohlen was not a student of factual causation. None of his published writing in the field of
torts contained anything more than a passing reference to causation, although at the time proxi-
mate cause was the umbrella term employed to address both factual cause and limits on liability.
See FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1926) (containing an anthology of
Bohlen's earlier publications). His two-volume, 1,500 page casebook contained two cases and
six pages on factual causation. See FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 223-29
(1915). The two cases came to conflicting outcomes on whether the plaintiff had to prove that
the defendant's tortious act was the sole cause of harm. Also included was a case equivalent to
City of Piqua v. Morris, 120 N.E. 300 (Ohio 1918), placed in the subsection of proximate cause
on intervening causes. Bohlen's only publication before the first Restatement that addressed
either multiple sufficient causes or duplicated harm was the third edition of his casebook, which
included Anderson, 179 N.W. 45, without commentary. FRANCIS H. BOHLEN, CASES ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 225-27 (3d ed. 1930). Anderson was the basis for an illustration contained in the
first Restatement that made a tortfeasor liable when his or her act, along with an innocent cause,
produced overdetermined harm. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: APPENDIX § 432 reporter's notes
(1966).
44. The comments to the first Restatement provide:
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The statement in Subsection (2) applies not only when the second force which is oper-
ating simultaneously with the force set in motion by the defendant's negligence is gen-
erated by the negligent conduct of a third person, but also when it is generated by an
innocent act of a third person or when its origin is unknown.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 432(2) cmt. d (1934).
Although the Restatement's language only addressed the matter of whether such a defendant's
act was a substantial factor-the causal language of the Restatement-in producing the harm, the
context, and the absence of any limitation on this provision in the remainder of the Restatement
reveal that § 432(2) and comment d were intended to resolve the question of the liability of the
defendant whose tortious act concurred with an innocent cause. Courts and commentators have
so understood it. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 561 (3d Cir. 1990); Basko v.
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 429 (2d Cir. 1969); State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712, 727 (Alaska
1972) (stating that when multiple sufficient causes are found, "liability should be imposed") (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). See also Vincent v. Fairbanks Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847,
851-52 (Alaska 1993) (quoting Abbott, 498 P.2d at 727, that when multiple sufficient causes
exist, "liability should be imposed" and applying it in a case in which one such cause was of
innocent origin); Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v. Eastside Bank, 789 P.2d 567, 574-75 (Mont. 1990);
Kyriss v. State, 707 P.2d 5, 7-8 (Mont. 1985); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., 4 THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 20.3, at 116 n.7 (2d ed. 1986); Karen L. Chadwick, "Causing" Enhanced Injuries in
Crashworthiness Cases, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1223, 1231 (1998); King, supra note 9, at 1370;
Christopher H. Schroeder, Two Methods for Evaluating Duty to Rescue Proposals, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 181, 183 n.8 (1986).
Professor Richard Wright agrees that § 432(2) resolves the matter of liability, not just causa-
tion, but reaches the conclusion in a different fashion. He believes that the Restatement's "sub-
stantial factor" element encompasses both factual and proximate cause, and therefore § 432(2)
addresses all matters bearing on liability, save duty and breach, in providing that causes of over-
determined harm can be found to be a substantial factor. Richard Wright, The Grounds and
Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1425, 1447 (2003). By contrast, I take the
Restatement at its word that there is a two step process in determining legal cause (the umbrella
term employed by the Restatement): (1) whether tortious conduct is a substantial factor in caus-
ing harm (factual cause), and (2) whether there is some rule that obviates the liability of the
defendant (proximate cause). The revision to the first Restatement of Torts makes this explicit in
explaining the two steps above and that "the 'substantial factor' element deals with causation in
fact while the other element deals with a legal policy relieving the actor of liability for harm he
has, as a matter of fact, caused." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433 reason for changes (Supp.
1949). While the Second Restatement did not reiterate this language, Reporter Prosser's treatise,
published concurrently, observed that while satisfying the "substantial factor" causal require-
ment was necessary to liability, it was not sufficient because other "considerations" could "pre-
vent liability." See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 241 (4th
ed. 1971). In support of his interpretation, Professor Wright does point to one subsection in the
Second Restatement contained in the "Substantial Factor" title that addresses matters outside the
realm of factual causation. The placement of that subsection, however, appears to be an unfor-
tunate by-product of a less-than-ideal revision process in both the 1948 and 1964 replacements
for the first Restatement. The title of the chapter that follows the "Substantial Factor" title,
"Rules Which Determine the Responsibility of a Negligent Actor for Harm Which his Conduct
is a Substantial Factor in Producing," reveals the separation of substantial factor and factual
causation from proximate cause limitations on liability. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS 449 (1965).
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comment d of § 432(2), "found general acceptance," 45 and he retained
it verbatim in the Second Restatement.46
In drafting the Third Restatement, we found the same split among
contemporary commentators that existed earlier. 47 We even found a
split of opinion on the state of the case law, with Professor Fischer
writing that the "weight of modern authority rejects the innocent/cul-
pable origin distinction, and holds a wrongdoer liable without regard
to the culpability of the other party. ' 48 Professor Wright, on the other
hand, stated that "[clourts generally absolve the defendant from liabil-
ity if he proves that the injury would have occurred anyway as a result
of independent non-tortious conditions. ' 49 Exploring the case law
45. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 243-44 n.26 (3d ed.
1964).
46. Both of the Restatements cast the standard for causation in the case of multiple sufficient
causes as that both "may" be found a cause of the harm. The use of "may" might be understood
to provide the factfinder some discretionary power to conclude that such a multiple sufficient
cause is not a substantial factor and, therefore, not a legal cause. I do not believe that interpreta-
tion to be correct. The reason for the discretionary "may" is not because of the multiple suffi-
cient cause circumstance but because the Restatements required that all causes reach the
threshold of being a substantial factor, meaning that it be more than just a trivial factor. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. b. reporters' note (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
47. Compare, e.g., HARPER ET AL., supra note 44, at 114-16 (endorsing treating one tortious
competing cause as a factual cause as "of greater merit" and furthering both deterrence and
compensation goals), with, e.g., Wright, supra note 30, at 1798 (explaining the corrective justice
objection to imposing liability on the defendant whose tortious act concurs with a sufficient
innocent cause to produce harm). Hart and Honor6 were conflicted on this matter. At one
point they declared that the tortious and innocent concurring causes were more doubtful than
when both causes were tortious. See HART & HONORI4, supra note 30, at 236. Later they sug-
gested that the early Cook case that absolved the defendant of liability was "discredited," but
that when duplicated harm occurs, the plaintiff cannot recover for the innocently caused portion
of the harm. See HART & HONORC, supra note 30, at 236, 239, 248.
Law and economics analysts concur with the corrective justice commentators that a tortfeasor
who concurs with an independent and sufficient innocent cause should not be held liable for the
harm. The explanation is that no additional deterrence is provided by holding the tortfeasor
liable in that suit, because there are already adequate incentives in place for the tortfeasor to
exercise the appropriate level of care. Exercising that care would not reduce the incidence of
loss when other innocent causes would produce the same harm. Thus, there is no reason to incur
the costs of an additional lawsuit if no beneficial deterrence incentives would be provided. WIL-
LIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 234-36
(1987); see also Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal Apportionment in the Law of Torts:
An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1414 (1980) (arguing from economic perspective
that the innocent cause has reduced the value of plaintiff's property to zero).
48. David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 1335, 1346
1381; see also Moore, supra note 40, at 1189-90.
49. Wright, supra note 30, at 1798. Professor Wright cited two Wisconsin cases in support of
this principle, both preceding the first Restatement of Torts. The first case arose when two fires
merged, one of tortious origin and the other of unknown origin, neither party having proved
whether the second fire was of tortious or innocent origin. The court held that the fire of un-
known origin was the proximate cause of the harm and a superseding cause for the negligently
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since the Second Restatement, we found that virtually every one of the
handful of cases to confront the situation adhered to the comment d
position. 50 With two Restatements dating back seventy years, there
started fire. Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898). Thirty
years later, the court went out of its way to modify Cook, stating that defendants would have a
defense to prove that a fire of unknown origin was due to natural causes and therefore a super-
seding cause. Wright also cited a British case, Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd., [1982] A.C. 794
(H.L.).
Recently, Professor Wright reaffirmed the position he expressed twenty years ago. To accom-
modate modern case law, however, including some that did not exist at the time of his California
article, he has modified his claim. Now, he finds a rule that the defendant may exonerate himself
or herself if he or she proves that the plaintiff would "almost certainly" have suffered the harm
due to a nontortious cause. Wright, supra note 44, at 1435. He dismisses the cases of the second
half of the twentieth century that hold a tortfeasor responsible for a multiple sufficient tortious
cause that concurs with an innocent cause with the claim that they are not inconsistent with his
"almost-certainty" defense. These cases are not inconsistent with it because, in Professor
Wright's account of them, none involves a situation in which it was "almost certain" that an
innocent cause was a multiple sufficient cause or because they involve cases in which the courts
were only addressing factual causation and therefore not addressing his limitation, which he
grounds in aspects other than factual cause. Id. at 1459. The former claim is a little like asserting
that there is a rule of law that defendants who are bald, have a last name of Green, and live in
North Carolina have immunity from liability and that all the case law is consistent with that
principle because, although they do not address it, no such person is a defendant in those cases.
The latter explanation rings hollow since the Restatement provisions imposing liability are an
aspect of its treatment of factual cause. That the courts in such a case did not discuss Professor
Wright's "almost certain" defense does not mean that it exists. Rather, I think it means that the
courts thought that there was no such limitation and that their treatment of the causation issue
resolved the matters required for liability of the defendant aside from duty and breach. Some of
the cases do focus narrowly on the question of the propriety of the causation instruction in light
of multiple sufficient causes. See, e.g., Fussell v. St. Clair, 818 P.2d 295, 298-99 (Idaho 1991).
Nevertheless, if the courts in those cases thought that there was an available defense to liability
under those circumstances, whether it had been asserted or not, one would expect that the court
would have mentioned it in the course of its explanation of the law applicable to these complex
and unusual circumstances. I address Professor Wright's claim that the defendant's burden of
proof is one of almost certainty in the context of harm that is duplicated by innocent and tortious
causes. See infra notes 121-42 and accompanying text.
Wright criticizes a reporters' note in the Third Restatement that cites Professor Fischer's state-
ment about the weight of modern authority on concurring innocent and tortious multiple suffi-
cient causes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. d
reporters' note (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). Wright asserts that "Fischer subsequently aban-
doned this claim." Wright, supra note 44, at 1452. Wright cites Fischer's subsequent statement
that "courts are split" on this question without either acknowledging or appreciating that a cross
reference for that statement refers to an earlier passage in which Professor Fischer stated, "many
courts impose liability on the sole tortfeasor when the other force is innocent." Fischer, supra
note 1, at 1130. Split they are, but the weight of modern authority is to impose liability, as
Fischer's footnotes, which cite to a number of cases, reveal. Id. at 1129-30 nn.7-9.
50. See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 427 (2d Cir. 1969); Vincent v. Fairbanks
Mem'l Hosp., 862 P.2d 847. 851-52 (Alaska 1993); Thomsen v. Rexall Drug & Chem. Co., 45
Cal. Rptr. 642, 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1965); Fussell, 818 P.2d at 298-99; Kitchen Krafters, Inc. v.
Eastside Bank, 789 P.2d 567, 574-75 (Mont. 1990) (treating breach of fiduciary duty and poor
economy as multiple sufficient causes of plaintiff's financial losses); Kyriss v. State, 707 P.2d 5,
7-8 (Mont. 1985); cf. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541, 561 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding
two potentially sufficient causes: (1) tortious conduct of defendant prior to 1966, and (2) post-
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seemed no compelling reason to reject that position.51 Indeed, the
case for imposing liability on the tortfeasor responsible for the multi-
ple sufficient cause is not unappealing. The tortfeasor is culpable, the
plaintiff (at least at the time of the first two Restatements) is innocent,
and there is a close relationship between the defendant's tortious act
and the plaintiff's harm, regardless of the existence of an innocent suf-
ficient cause.52 Why should the plaintiff go away with no compensa-
tion under these circumstances? 53
The Third Restatement, while omitting the unfortunate and obfus-
cating "substantial factor" language, so provides: "This Section applies
regardless of whether the other cause involves tortious conduct or
consists only of innocent conduct. As long as the competing cause was
sufficient to produce the same harm as the defendant's tortious con-
duct, this Section is applicable. ' 54 Thus, if I should decide to stop
talking now, realizing that I have nothing further to say, and simulta-
neously Steve Landsman declares in no uncertain terms that it is time
for me to stop, he is a cause of the quiet in the room and is liable to
the audience for damages resulting from missing out on the remainder
of my erudition. In conclusion, causation has taken the day and deter-
mined that the tortfeasor who concurs with an innocent cause is liable
for damages reflecting the overdetermined harm. Note that the audi-
ence is no worse off because of Landsman's tortious (and heinous)
act, as they would have suffered equally in a tort-free world.
1966 behavior preempted from tort liability by federal law). But cf. Young v. Flathead County,
757 P.2d 772, 777 (Mont. 1988) (stating the rule, in dicta, as encompassing situations when the
competing cause involves "the conduct of one or more [defendants that] would have been suffi-
cient to produce the same result"). To this list should be added Utzinger v. United States, 432
F.2d 485, 486-88 (6th Cir. 1970), in which a drunken boat driver ran into an obstruction near
shore for which the defendant was responsible. A possible scenario is that if the obstruction had
not been there, the boat would have rammed into the shore resulting in similar injury. In an
opinion that does not squarely confront the issue the court held the government was not liable.
Id. at 491-92 (McCree, J., dissenting in part). The court's decision could be understood as hold-
ing that the concurrence of the decedent's negligence (contributory negligence being a nontor-
tious cause) and the defendant's negligence as sufficient causes for the harm is insufficient for
liability. Id. But the complexity of the facts and the court's ambiguity about whether its decision
was based on a lack of factual causation, proximate cause, or no negligence by the government
leaves the case an unsatisfying precedent on the multiple sufficient cause matter.
51. Bill Powers would, for reasons explained later, want me to add that these provisions were
drafted before he joined as a co-reporter. Bill became a co-reporter after the untimely and
tragic death of Gary Schwartz. Gary never had the opportunity to look at these provisions, so I
bear full responsibility for them.
52. See Moore, supra note 40, at 1265 (claiming that corrective justice supports imposing lia-
bility in this instance).
53. I recognize the rejoinder is that the plaintiff would have to go away with no compensation
if only the innocent cause were in operation at the time.
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 cmt. d (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
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Before conceding, I want to reconsider the wrongful death hedonic
damages cases. Recall that a few courts permit recovery for the
pleasures of life foregone because the tortfeasor has ended the dece-
dent's life. From a causal perspective, the tortious act has preempted
any other cause of the decedent's death, including the driver who later
comes on the scene and negligently runs over the decedent's corpse.
It seems equally true that innocent causes of death-a lightning strike
or other natural disaster-are also preempted from constituting
causes of the decedent's death. But if that is true, it is equally true of
natural causes of death. That is to say, old age or disease has been
preempted as a cause of death for someone who is already dead. Log-
ically, then, the defendant in a wrongful death case has caused the
decedent the loss of hedonic pleasure for an unlimited, infinite dura-
tion; the tortious death preempts any harm that those subsequent nat-
ural causes would have produced. 55
Not only can that not be, it is not. Wrongful death damages that
flow from the premature death of the decedent are limited by the ac-
tuarially predicted date of death (or, in the case of earnings capacity,
retirement 56) of the decedent. 57
In addition to this limitation on the duration of damages running
afoul of the causal concept of preemption, there is a tension between
this rule and the rule previously discussed that multiple sufficient
causes, when one is innocent and the other tortious, are each a cause
of the harm. In these death cases, the two causes do not concur simul-
taneously to produce the harm. Yet, when we consider the time when
death would have occurred (in the absence of the preempting cause),
there is more than a passing similarity. We can conceptualize the pe-
riod after actuarially predicted death would have occurred as an over-
determined outcome, although to distinguish it from forces that harm
55. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 1137. A different conception about what constitutes a
cause-so far I have taken seriously the idea that factual causation is largely a nonnormative
inquiry into the counterfactual state in which necessary conditions are required-could produce
different results. See infra note 101.
56. The assumption that earnings capacity ends at retirement is no longer accurate, as a ma-
jority of preretirees intend to continue working after they retire. See S. KATHI BROWN, STAYING
AHEAD OF THE CURVE 2003: THE AARP WORKING IN RETIREMENT STUDY 15 (2003).
57. See, e.g., Burke v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 981, 989 (D. Md. 1985); Monias v. Endal,
623 A.2d 656, 659 (Md. 1993) ("We hold, in accord with the majority of other jurisdictions, that
the proper measure of lost earnings damages in a personal injury action for a plaintiff whose life
expectancy is reduced by the defendant's negligence.is the plaintiff's loss of earnings based on
the plaintiff's life expectancy had the tortious conduct not occurred."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 924 cmt. e (1979); Fischer, supra note 1, at 1137-39.
Since mortality tables reflect averages for the population, it remains for the parties to attempt
to show that the decedent was, in some relevant respect, not average and therefore would have
survived for something other than that shown in mortality tables.
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simultaneously I refer to it as "duplicated harm" or a "duplicated out-
come."' 58 Why should actuarially predicted death, most frequently
due to innocent causes, end the period for which damages are recov-
ered when both the tortious cause of death and the hypothetical natu-
ral cause of death are each sufficient causes of the hedonic loss
beginning at the time when the decedent would otherwise have died?
Death due to natural causes is, to be sure, a hypothetical event rather
than an event that actually occurred because it is physically pre-
empted by the wrongful death. Yet that difference should result in
natural death playing, if anything, a less significant role with regard to
the harm caused by the tortfeasor than a concurring innocent cause.
We might attribute this anomaly and tension to pragmatism. After
all, how can we expect a tortfeasor to pay damages for a loss in
perpetuity? The sum is not infinite-some specific award would be
sufficient to throw off a stream of income in perpetuity-but the idea
is sufficiently mind boggling that we need not pursue it.
But pragmatism fails to explain the rule. When we dig just a little
deeper, we discover that a defendant is not liable for any harm that is
duplicated by the defendant's tort and some future potential innocent
cause. 59 Indeed, the defendant is also not liable for duplicated harm
when the duplication is the result of an actual event, rather than the
hypothetical actuarially predicted date of death that never occurred.
Thus, consider a woman incapacitated by a tortfeasor such that she
loses one hundred percent of her earnings capacity and is then killed
by an act of God before trial.60 The recovery for lost earning capacity
will be limited to the period from the time of the tort until the time of
58. I also employ the term "duplicative cause" and "innocent cause" to describe those actual
and hypothetical events that affect the damages for which a defendant is liable. I do so for
convenience of expression even though those "causes" are preempted from truly causing the
harm by the earlier tortious cause and, in some cases, by the fact that the cause never actually
occurred because the tortious act prevented the innocent cause, as when a person with a termi-
nal disease is killed prematurely by a tortious act.
59. David Fischer has painstakingly documented the state of the law on these questions.
Fischer, supra note 1, at 1136-45, 1153-55; see also The Pocahontas, 109 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1940).
The statement in the text requires qualification because at least a few conflicting decisions exist.
See, e.g., Moore v. The Sally J., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1263 (W.D. Wash. 1998); Buchalski v.
Universal Marine Corp., 393 F. Supp. 246 (W.D. Wash. 1975); see also Harris v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 58 F.3d 1140 (6th Cir. 1995) (declaring Buchalski unpersuasive).
60. The "before trial" qualification reflects the impact of concerns about finality that limit the




death.61 Similarly, the period for which pain and suffering damages
can be recovered terminates with the death of the victim. 62
This then reveals that pragmatism cannot account for the treatment
of post natural-death damages and confronts us with a considerable
anomaly for simultaneously occurring, overdetermined harm resulting
from sufficient tortious and innocent causes. As explained above,
when tortious and innocent sufficient causes concur, the party respon-
sible for the tortious cause is held liable for the entire harm. Yet,
given the treatment of duplicated harm when one cause is innocent, if
the innocent cause occurs just after the tortious cause has already
caused the harm, the responsible tortfeasor will be liable for damages
based only on the brief period of time that separated the two causes.
A similar anomaly, although one easier to accept, also exists if the
innocent cause just precedes the tortious cause. In that case, the
tortfeasor will not be held liable for any damages, but the idea of pre-
emption seems to justify that result: the tortfeasor did not cause any
harm because it had already occurred.
That these results are not a matter of factual causation is confirmed
by the treatment of duplicated harm when both of the causes are of
tortious origin. Although there is very little consideration of this situ-
ation in American case law, cases from Britain and Canada are in
agreement. 63 Reconsider the victim who is incapacitated by a
tortfeasor and suffers a total loss of earnings capacity. Rather than
resulting from a subsequent act of God, she is shot by a criminal, caus-
ing permanent paralysis, and this occurs before trial. Notwithstanding
that the second tortious act duplicated her lost earnings capacity from
that point on, the plaintiff would be permitted to recover from the
first tortfeasor for her lost earnings capacity, undiminished by the sec-
ond tortfeasor's duplication. One might explain this outcome by
pointing out that the initial injury preempted any role for the second
tortfeasor's conduct. That is true, but only underscores that the differ-
ence between treatment of damages in this circumstance and that em-
61. See Nemmers v. United States, 795 F.2d 628, 636 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986); City of Tampa v.
Johnson, 114 So. 2d 807 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Denman v. Johnston, 48 N.W. 565 (Mich.
1891). See generally Mark A. Rothstein, Preventing the Discovery of Plaintiff Genetic Profiles by
Defendants Seeking to Limit Damages in Personal Injury Litigation, 71 IND. L.J. 877, 884-85
(1996).
62. See Badia v. City of Casa Grande, 988 P.2d 134, 140 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999).
63. See Spose v. Ragu Foods, Inc., 537 N.Y.S.2d 739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989); Stene v. Evans,
[1958] 14 D.L.R.2d 73 (Alb. Sup. Ct. App. Div.); Long v. Thiessen & Laliberte, 65 W.W.R. 577
(B.C. Ct. App. 1968); Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd., [1961] 2 Q.B. 162 (dicta), affd,
[1964] A.C. 371 (1962); Baker v. Willoughby, [1970] A.C. 467 (H.L. 1969); HART & HONORS,
supra note 30, at 247 ("If both are wrongful the victim recovers the whole of his loss from the
first wrongdoer.").
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ployed when the second cause is innocent must be grounded in
something other than causation.
Robert Peaslee developed a theory to justify the limited liability of
a tortfeasor who causes harm that is later duplicated by an innocent
cause that several commentators have found attractive.64 Peaslee sug-
gested that the damages should be determined based on the value of
the property or interest at the time the tortfeasor caused the harm. A
looming calamity that threatened imminent destruction of the prop-
erty reduces its market value to a fraction of what it would have been,
so that the tortfeasor has caused only a small loss. This theory
emerged from the case that spawned Peaslee's inquiry, Dillon v. Twin
State Gas & Electric Co.65
In Dillon, a fourteen-year-old boy was playing on a girder at the top
of defendant's bridge, some nineteen feet above the road. He lost his
balance and grabbed an electrical wire to stabilize himself. The wire
was charged with high voltage. The defendant could be found negli-
gent in failing to protect those who might come in contact with it. The
electricity killed the child, but had he not been killed by electrocution,
he might have fallen from the girder and been killed or seriously in-
jured. Alternatively, he might have regained his balance and suffered
no injury, independent of the electrocution. 66 The court ruled that the
factfinder's determination of what would have occurred would affect
the damage recovery: the defendant would only be liable for the
"value" of the earnings capacity of the decedent in light of what would
have happened to him if he had not been electrocuted. If serious in-
jury would have resulted, the child would have had diminished earn-
ing capacity, and the defendant would only be liable for the loss of
that diminished earning capacity.
If this "value at the time" theory works, it would provide a consid-
erable comeback for me in my debate with Bill Powers. "Value" in this
sense is merely an altered description of the harm; instead of loss of a
healthy child's lifetime earning capacity, the decedent suffered a loss
64. See Peaslee, supra note 42. Among the commentators endorsing Peaslee's theory to ex-
plain nonsimultaneous sufficient causes is William Prosser. See PROSSER, supra note 44, at 321;
see also JOHN FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 187 n.23 (3d ed. 1965).
65. 163 A. 111 (N.H. 1932). Peaslee's interest in this subject, it seems fair to infer, was gener-
ated by his being the Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court at the time it decided
Dillon.
66. Id. at 115. The court's opinion suggests, without explicitly stating, that the decedent did
not fall after being electrocuted and his body remained on the girder. In the last paragraph of its
opinion, the court stated that what would have happened to the decedent absent the electrocu-
tion would have to be determined at trial and observed that this included, "[w]hether the shock
from the current threw him back on the girder ... ." Id.
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of earning capacity as if he were born with a handicap that reduced his
life prospects and earning capacity.67 Much as I would like to claim
victory (in no small part because of how infrequently it occurs when
Bill and I disagree), I cannot. At least not at this point. The value
theory simply will not carry the day.
Consider a factory destroyed in a fire ignited by a camper's negli-
gently discarded cigarette. Twelve hours later, a newly developed
weather system causes a tornado that rips through town and destroys
everything in its path, including the ashes of the factory. At the time
that the factory was destroyed, the tornado did not exist, and the fac-
tory's value would be undiminished by the prospects for such an act of
God.68 Similarly, consider the plaintiff rendered a paraplegic in an
automobile accident who later contracts a neurological disease that
would have deprived her of the use of her lower body if she had not
already lost it. The value theory cannot account for the defendant
being liable for the plaintiff's lost earnings only from the time of the
accident to when her disease would otherwise have caused her para-
plegia.69 Thus, the value theory is inadequate to explain the law.70
67. At this point, I might expect a quick-witted skeptic to point out that even in this situation,
the loss of earning capacity after death is overdetermined; each of the handicap and the tortious
cause of death being responsible for the first increment of lost earning capacity (the difference
between a normal child and a handicapped child's earning capacity) and the death being solely
responsible for the remainder of the loss (a handicapped child's earning capacity). The skeptic
would be right, which underscores David Fischer's observation that "in virtually every tort case
both the wrongful act of the defendant and some other force, not attributable to the defendant,
are each individually sufficient to cause some portion of the harm arising from the injury."
Fischer, supra note 1, at 1127-28.
Indeed, with Professor Fischer's observation on the table, I will reveal something that I
blithely skipped over at the beginning of this paper. In discussing the role of harm identification
in determining damages, I mentioned acceleration of the onset of disease and thin-skull preexist-
ing conditions as examples of the need for careful definition of the harm. Supra notes 22-27 and
accompanying text. Each of those examples entailed duplicated harm in which innocent pre-
empted causes existed and strongly influenced our intuitions about the correct formulation of
the harm.
68. There is always some small background risk of an act of God that theoretically affects the
value of property. That proposition need not detain us, as it is greater than average risks that are
unknown at the time the harm is caused by a tortious act that reveals the inadequacy of the value
explanation.
69. See Melito v. Genesee Hosp., 561 N.Y.S.2d 951, 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (discussing
stroke occurring three years after heart attack for which defendant was responsible); Russell v.
Cox, 451 N.W.2d 804 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (addressing innocently caused injury occurring almost
two years after initial tortious injury).
70. Prudence suggests a caveat. Perhaps the value theory is only a partial explanation of what
is going on in duplicated harm cases. Some other theory might explain the cases discussed above
for which the value theory is inadequate. If so, I have to leave to someone else identifying the
other theory, as I cannot.
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Nevertheless, there is one criticism of the value theory that I do not
want to endorse, for reasons explained below.71
I do not think it a criticism of the value theory that it would, if
accepted, overturn the rule regarding concurring innocent and tor-
tious causes of overdetermined harm. If the prospect of the child in
Dillon falling to his death diminishes the value of his life for tort pur-
poses, then surely the innocent fire that would destroy a house in the
absence of a competing tortious fire has reduced the value of the
house to nothing, and the tortfeasor responsible for the latter fire
would not be liable for any damages.
Dean Prosser confronted the conflict between the value theory that
he endorsed, and the rule of liability (when a tortious cause concurs
with an innocent cause) contained in the Restatement, for which he
served as reporter, and supported in his treatise.7 2 His explanation
was that application of the value theory to multiple sufficient causes
with one of innocent origin "is unsound, since any decrease in value of
the property before destruction must be attributed equally to the
threat of each fire."' 73 One might read Prosser's claim as bearing on
apportionment of liability. On that reading, damages would be appor-
tioned between the tortfeasor and, in some figurative sense, the
source of the innocent fire.74 The tortfeasor would then pay half of
the damages associated with the loss. That seems an unlikely interpre-
tation, as no case had suggested that outcome, and the Restatement
and Prosser's treatise supported full liability for the defendant respon-
sible for such a tortious fire. If, however, Prosser did not mean to
address apportionment, then his argument fails. After all, each of the
two fires reduce the value of the house to zero, not one-half its pre-
existing market value. And, indeed, in the duplicated harm cases, the
tortious cause and the innocent cause, if known in advance, also each
reduce the value of the duplicated harm to zero.75 Yet that does not
result in ignoring the role of the innocent cause when duplicated harm
occurs. In the end, Prosser's distinction does not work, leaving me to
71. See infra text accompanying notes 101-102.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 cmt. d (1965); PROSSER, supra note 44, § 41,
at 239-40. I cite to the fourth edition of Prosser's treatise because the subsequent version was
prepared by several other authors after Prosser's death. Professor King, another adherent to the
value theory, ran into the same problem with multiple sufficient tortious causes. See King, supra
note 9, at 1362-63.
73. PROSSER, supra note 44, at 321 n.85.
74. The discussion occurs in a section of Prosser's treatise denominated "Apportionment of
Damages." Id. § 52, at 313-23.
75. This reveals another problem with the value theory that I would endorse: it would also
reverse the law when two tortious causes produce an overdetermined harm. See Fischer, supra
note 1, at 1150.
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conclude that there is no good basis to justify a different resolution of
duplicated harm and overdetermined harm when one cause is tortious
and the other is innocent.
The tension between the damages rule employed in duplicated
harm cases and in the overdetermined harm cases leads me to return
to the appropriate treatment of overdetermined harms. As explained
above, the Restatements and the vast majority of (admittedly sparse)
case law since the Second Restatement impose liability on the defen-
dant responsible for a tortious cause that concurs with an innocent
cause to produce overdetermined harm.76 Yet there are a number of
cases that fail to appreciate the existence of concurring innocent and
tortious causes and, in that omission, raise questions about the robust-
ness of the Restatement's position on this question.
Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 77 is a leading modern case that supports
the Restatement position. In Basko, the plaintiff took two different
drugs serially, each of which the jury could have found caused his ad-
verse reaction. The jury could have found, however, that one was not
defective for its failure to warn because that adverse reaction was un-
foreseeable at the time. By contrast, the jury could have found the
other drug contained inadequate warnings by the time that plaintiff
took it. The Second Circuit found the trial court erred in instructing
on causation by failing to address the situation of the two drugs being
multiple sufficient causes of the plaintiff's disease. The court ex-
plained that "plaintiff would be entitled to recover if the jury found
that either Aralen or Triquin alone would have been sufficient to pro-
duce" 78 plaintiff's disease.
A variation on Basko that diminishes its probity on the issue at
hand arose more recently in another Second Circuit drug case,
Zuchowicz v. United States, in an opinion by Judge Calabresi. 79 The
76. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. As explained in note 49, some courts ad-
dress the narrow question of the appropriate instruction on causation and do not explicitly make
any statement about liability. Yet as that note also points out, if those courts believed there was
some non-cause-based defense to liability in those circumstances, I would expect them to say so.
77. 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969).
78. Id. at 429. In his dismissal of Basko as not inconsistent with the limitation that he advo-
cates for concurring innocent and tortious causes, see supra note 44, Professor Wright character-
izes the quoted language as "dicta." Wright, supra note 44, at 1462. He explains that this is so
because the factual predicate for his defense based on proof there was almost certainly an inno-
cent concurring cause with the defendant's tortious conduct was not present in the case. To put
this as mildly as I can, Professor Wright's conception of what constitutes dicta is different from
mine: If every statement of law necessary to the disposition of the case based on the facts
presented is rendered dicta by the conjuring of some exception not presented by the facts of the
case, there is nothing but dicta in the reporters.
79. 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998).
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decedent received twice the maximum dose of a drug due to the negli-
gence of government physicians or pharmacists or both and subse-
quently died from a rare disease. Judge Calabresi addressed the
matter of adequate proof that the overdose, as opposed to the proper
dose of the drug, caused the decedent's disease. One might analogize
this situation to Basko by treating the ordinary dose as equivalent to
the first drug the plaintiff received in Basko, and the overdose in
Zuchowicz-the extra dose that was negligently provided-as the
equivalent of the second drug ingested by the plaintiff in Basko after
the defendant had notice and should have provided a warning.80 Yet,
in the course of a wide ranging discourse on causation that has already
made it into one of the leading torts casebooks, 81 Judge Calabresi con-
cluded that the overdose alone would have had to have caused the
decedent's disease for the plaintiff to recover. 82 In short, a modern
tort law icon failed to appreciate the possibility that the decedent's
disease was overdetermined by both the correct dose (which by hy-
pothesis would have been sufficient alone) and the overdose (which
also would have been sufficient given the hypothesis and the fact that
the overdose was equal to the correct dose). I do not think I am going
out on a limb to say that if Zuchowicz were modified so that both
doses were tortiously provided-either by the same defendant or sep-
arate ones-the case would readily have been identified as one involv-
ing overdetermined harm and that liability would be imposed
regardless of whether one dose or the doubled dose was required to
cause the disease. I do not know how frequent these instances of fail-
ing to appreciate the existence of overdetermined harm are, but I sus-
pect it is not uncommon. 83
Another arguable incursion on the Second Restatement's position is
reflected in City of Piqua v. Morris,84 and its progeny. The defen-
dant's negligence resulted in nonfunctioning drains that were designed
to prevent excess water from overflowing its reservoirs, thereby caus-
ing harm to adjacent landowners. An extraordinary rain occurred,
80. This analogy is intuitively more attractive if the drug were provided in multiple tablets so
that there is a physical instance of the correct dose and the overdose. Yet I cannot articulate a
reason why it should matter if the decedent received one pill or two. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
81. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 349-55
(7th ed. 2001).
82. Zuchowicz, 140 F.3d at 390.
83. Another such case is State Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central
Power & Light Co., 351 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1976), in which the court failed to appreciate that an
innocent cause concurred with a tortious cause in killing fish by lowering the temperature of the
water below what the fish could withstand.
84. 120 N.E. 300 (Ohio 1918).
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one that could not have been contained even if the drains were func-
tioning properly, and the plaintiff's land was flooded. Because of the
common usage of proximate cause to encompass both factual cause
and limitations on liability,85 and the concept of an act of God as a
defense to liability, the court's opinion is ambiguous about the basis
on which it found that the defendant was not liable. 86
Regardless of the basis on which the court in City of Piqua relied, at
least some sophisticated legal observers think that the issue is one of
factual cause. In the casebook authored by Professors Franklin and
Rabin, they utilize a hypothetical equivalent to City of Piqua and ob-
serve that there is a "clear" absence of factual cause.8 7 Perhaps even
more telling, in the same section in which the Restatement of Torts
declares that concurring innocent and tortious sufficient causes are
each a cause of harm, there are two illustrations, both equivalent to
City of Piqua, that declare that in each case the tortious conduct "is
not a cause [of the harm]. '88
These cases of innocent overwhelming forces and negligence in fail-
ing to take precautions against less severe forces can be understood as
involving multiple sufficient causes.8 9 I do not think they have to be
so described because the unitary nature of the overwhelming force
presents a conceptual difficulty for the NESS test: Can we conceive of
the flood as involving two portions of excess water (either of which in
combination with the defendant's negligence is a sufficient set to
cause the defendant's harm)? 90 If we can take that conceptual step,
then we have multiple sufficient causes, and the City of Piqua situa-
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt. g (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
86. The court used or quoted language that suggested that the basis for the decision was fac-
tual causation ("[i]f the superior force would have produced the same damage, whether the
defendant had been negligent or not, his negligence is not deemed the cause of the injury," City
of Piqua, 120 N.E. at 302 (quoting 1 SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENCE § 39 (6th ed.))), proximate cause ("[I]iability extends no further, and he is not held
responsible for inevitable accidents, nor for injuries occasioned by extraordinary floods, which
could not be anticipated or guarded against by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable foresight,
care, and skill," id. at 303 (quoting Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 57 F. 441,
448 (1893))), and that the act of God argument was an affirmative defense. Id.
87. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 81, at 342.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 illus. 1-2 (1965); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 432 illus. 1-2 (1934). The reporter's notes to § 432 cite City of Piqua in support of the illustra-
tion that is similar to it. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS APPENDIX § 432, at 118 (1966).
89. Indeed, Professor Wright insists that they are. See Wright, supra note 44, at 1440, 1445.
Professor Fischer questions that judgment in David A. Fischer, Insufficient Causes, 94 Ky. L.J.
(forthcoming 2006) ("My intuitive reaction is that the negligence has caused no injury at all.").
90. See Moore, supra note 40, at 1247-48 (describing such cases and explaining their inconsis-
tency with a but-for standard for causation).
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tion stands in opposition to the Second Restatement.9' Indeed, even if
City of Piqua is not about factual causation, and grounds its rule of
nonliability on some other basis, it is inconsistent with the Second Re-
statement. Judgments such as those of Professors Franklin, Rabin, and
Fischer-again the conceptual qualification-are flatly contrary.
Another inroad into the Restatement's position on tortious and in-
nocent concurring causes exists when both causes involve a failure to
prevent or avoid a risk of harm that exists independently of those fail-
ures, and preventing the harm would require both omissions to be cor-
rected. 92 Thus, most courts find that when an omitted warning would
not have been read even if it had been provided, the omission is not a
cause of the harm.93 Similarly, the driver who negligently fails to ap-
ply brakes that had, just prior, failed without warning, is not a cause of
the harm that occurs in a resulting accident. 94
The difficulty in recognizing these cases as involving overdeter-
mined harm is again conceptual. When the tortious conduct consists
of actively creating risk, such as starting a fire or shooting a gun, it is
easy to ask the counterfactual inquiry required: in the absence of the
other sufficient cause, would the cause of interest have been sufficient
to produce the harm? The counterfactual inquiry with multiple suffi-
cient causes only requires eliminating the other sufficient cause and
making the standard but-for inquiry. When the acts involved consist
of failures to prevent, however, the counterfactual inquiry requires ad-
ding something that did not exist to the existing baseline facts. Thus,
with an omitted warning that was not read, one must add a fact-that
the omitted warning would have been read-to the counterfactual in-
91. The Second Restatement is inconsistent in its specific treatment of the City of Piqua situa-
tion. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. It is also inconsistent in its general resolution of
the question of concurring innocent and tortious multiple sufficient causes. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 cmt. d (1965).
92. Professor Fischer labels these cases "dependently sufficient causes" and discusses them in
Fischer, supra note 89.
93. See Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Oklahoma
law); Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1225 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying
Minnesota law); Sowles v. Urschel Labs., Inc., 595 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying
Minnesota law); Anderson v. Bungee Int'l Mfg. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539-40 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Cox, 477 So. 2d 963 (Ala. 1985); Bushong v. Garman Co., 843
S.W.2d 807, 811 (Ark. 1992); Cobb Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Hertron Chem. Co., 229
S.E.2d 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Parzini v. Ctr. Chem. Co., 201 S.E.2d 808, 809 (Ga. Ct. App.
1973), vacated on other grounds, 218 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1975); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Baker, 515 So. 2d
655 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Hiner v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 978 P.2d 505 (Wash. 1999); see also
DOBBS, supra note 29, § 367, at 1017 ("[I]f the plaintiff failed to read the content-inadequate
warning, it is frequently difficult to see how a more adequate warning would have made any
difference .... ").
94. Cf Saunders Sys. Birmingham Co. v. Adams, 117 So. 72 (Ala. 1928).
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quiry about whether the omitted warning was a cause of harm. Ad-
ding facts runs counter to the conventional counterfactual causation
inquiry of taking the world as it is and asking what would have oc-
curred without the tortious conduct of interest. Intuitively, but per-
haps not rationally, omitting the existence of competing sufficient
causes in the counterfactual inquiry is more comfortable than adding
additional facts, such as the omitted failure to prevent. 95
The difficulty with these failures to prevent is not limited to the
concurring, innocent/tortious concurring cause circumstance. One can
imagine a case in which a product manufacturer omitted a necessary
warning and a person other than the plaintiff negligently failed to read
what instructions were provided. 96 Such cases are rare, however, and
it remains to be seen if courts will turn away plaintiffs who were in-
jured in circumstances in which two tortfeasors committed negligent
acts, each involving a failure to intervene to prevent harm, that con-
curred to permit the harm to occur.
The first two Restatements limited their provisions on causes of
overdetermined harm to "two forces [that] are actively operating. '97
That language might be understood to exclude dependent omissions,
such as those discussed above, thereby excluding concurring failures
to prevent from the treatment of concurring innocent and tortious
causes. Prosser appreciated this problem and also assumed that the
"actively operating" language of § 432(2) did not encompass failures
to prevent. He opined, however, that if the case arose, liability would
be imposed, at least when both omissions were the result of tortious
conduct.98 There is considerable academic support for Prosser's posi-
95. That intuition-making the counterfactual inquiry required to determine causation does
not permit altering the existing state of affairs by adding factual circumstances-may explain the
limitation in the first two Restatements. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
96. See Safeco, 515 So. 2d at 655. In many cases, the person failing to read the instructions-
and therefore the other sufficient cause-is the plaintiff. In a day when contributory negligence
barred a plaintiff's recovery, failing to appreciate these cases as involving causal overdetermina-
tion would not have changed the outcome. With comparative responsibility now the overwhelm-
ing rule, however, misdiagnosing these multiple sufficient failures to prevent does run counter to
the law on overdetermined outcomes.
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965). I have been unable to locate the
source of the "actively operating" language, although intuitions about the appropriate process
for conducting a causal inquiry may be at work. See supra note 95. The logical culprit is Jer-
emiah Smith who first employed the "substantial factor" language to address causation, albeit
for defining the scope of liability rather than factual cause and multiple sufficient causes as it is
employed in the Restatement. See Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L.
REV. 103, 103, 303 (1911). His work, however, contains no such qualification.
98. See PROSSER, supra note 44, § 41, at 243-44 n.24. The revisers of the treatise responsible
for the fifth edition did not share his view-the opinion about the outcome of such a concur-
rence of causes is omitted in that edition.
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tion but scant caselaw addressing the matter.99 If he is right that two
tortious failures to prevent would justify liability, then we have an
even more serious incursion on the previous Restatements' imposition
of liability on an active tortious cause that concurs with an innocent
cause. Thus, concurring innocent and tortious failures to prevent
would not result in liability, while concurring tortious causes that
failed to prevent would.
Several conclusions seem inescapable from the foregoing discus-
sion. First, the Restatements appropriately resolve the matter of over-
determined harm when both causes are the result of tortious conduct.
And if an act or force is a factual cause when it is the result of tortious
conduct, it must equally be a cause when there is no tortious conduct
behind it.100 For factual cause, as we understand it, entails no assess-
ment of the culpability of the human agent responsible for it-indeed,
forces of nature have no human agency, yet constitute causes of harm,
sometimes incalculable harm, as revealed by the 2004 tsunami in the
Indian Ocean. 01
99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27, cmt. i (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) ("In such instances, a strong case can be made that causal rules
should not be employed so as to leave the injured person remediless."); BECHT & MILLER, supra
note 36, at 8-9 (concluding that to exonerate both tortfeasors would be "morally indefensible
and constitute an "inexcusable" outcome); Fischer, supra note 89 ("Surely, it is unfair to allow
each negligent tortfeasor to escape liability by hiding behind the negligent omission of the
other."); Robertson, supra note 13, at 1787. But cf. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Baker, 515 So. 2d 655, 658
(La. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that product manufacturer that failed to provide adequate warning
was not cause in fact of harm when installer failed to read warnings provided; installer also found
liable at trial but did not appeal).
100. See HART & HONORt, supra note 30, at 235 ("In our view... when each factor is suffi-
cient, with other normal conditions, to bring about the harm as and when it occurs, each is
properly described as a cause of the harm."); Moore, supra note 40, at 1265 (asserting that distin-
guishing between two tortious concurring causes and an innocent and tortious concurring cause
must be accomplished on other than causal grounds). Moore goes on to assert that the distinc-
tion has to be in the relevant state of the world that is taken as the baseline for the causal
inquiry: we take into account the natural cause as part of the baseline. I find that suggestion
unpersuasive as there is no basis for employing that baseline when the concurring cause is inno-
cent yet not employing it when it is tortious, a point that leads Moore himself to a similar conclu-
sion about the persuasiveness of the baseline explanation.
101. One might have a different view of this matter with a different idea about factual causa-
tion. The Second Restatement employed the concept of substantial factor as the definition of a
cause and the indeterminacy of that standard might permit distinguishing among causes based on
the culpability of the actor responsible for the cause. Indeed, the Restatement explains that to
constitute a "substantial factor," the act must have "such an effect in producing the harm as to
lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense, in which there
always lurks the idea of responsibility." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965).
With that understanding of causation, distinctions could be drawn between tortious and innocent
forces, although that would be done as a matter of fact rather than of law. Preliminary empirical
work by Professor David Fischer reveals considerable variation in the way students respond to
several of the situations discussed above, including concurring failures to prevent. See Fischer,
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Second, there is a strong tension-I am tempted to say an irrecon-
cilable conflict-between the first two Restatements' treatment of con-
curring innocent and tortious causes of overdetermined harm and the
case law when duplicated harm results from an innocent and tortious
cause. We could have a legal regime in which those two rules both
exist, but it is difficult to find an explanation for why we treat those
two situations differently. It could be that the duplicated harm rule is
wrong, but the implications of that when it comes to natural death as
an innocent duplicating cause are simply inconceivable. 10 2 Moreover,
the treatment of duplicated harm is longstanding, abundant, and re-
markably consistent.10 3
These observations lead to two further, related conclusions: the
treatment of concurring innocent and tortious duplicated harm has a
source in some area other than factual causation,10 4 and the first two
Restatements (and the current Restatement draft) have gone awry in
resolving the matter of the liability of a tortfeasor whose conduct con-
curs with an innocent cause to produce overdetermined harm. Cause
the tortfeasor's act is, but liability should not follow. That liability
should not follow is a result of the prior observation about the tension
between duplicated and overdetermined harm when innocent and tor-
tious forces concur.
If the latter conclusion is correct, then some other aspect of tort law
must step up and provide the basis for the outcome.10 5 For duplicated
harm, it seems quite sensible to assign that task to the process of de-
termining for what harm the defendant is liable-an item I previously
supra note 89. That work does not tell us how, after group deliberations, juries might resolve
this question.
102. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
103. See Fischer, supra note 89 (characterizing as "nearly all pervasive" the limitation on du-
plicated damages when one cause is innocent).
104. David Fischer has persuaded me to limit this claim to actively operating forces and leave
out the instance of concurring omission cases. See supra notes 89, 98-99 and accompanying text.
Fischer correctly points out that most would think of the nonliability of an actor who failed to
prevent harm that could have been prevented only if both the actor interceded and some other
innocent omission also were otherwise as based on a lack of causation. To explain the foregoing
with a concrete example, if a night watchman negligently fails to turn on a security alarm that
would not have worked in any case because of an unprecedented electrical storm that was ade-
quate to disable it, we would explain the nonliability of the night watchman on the grounds of a
lack of causation. In many such cases, perhaps in all, only lack of imagination would prevent
there being a concurring nontortious cause to concur with the tortious omission.
105. Twenty years ago, in his illuminating article on causation, Professor Wright suggested
that the determination was one of proximate cause and damages: "It is a proximate-cause issue
of policy or principle that is most appropriately placed under the heading of damages, and it also
arises in the duplicative-causation cases." Wright, supra note 30, at 1798.
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suggested is an aspect of damages law. 10 6 That may not be as appro-
priate a home for addressing the liability of a tortfeasor whose act
concurs with an innocent cause to produce an overdetermined harm,
as the outcome there, for reasons expressed above, would be to negate
any liability, an all-or-nothing proposition.
Richard Wright, who recently addressed this question, finds a prin-
ciple that a defendant is not liable if the plaintiff's harm would have
occurred, regardless of the defendant's acts, as the result of innocent
causes. 10 7 He asserts that this is an affirmative defense'0 8 for which
the defendant's burden is to establish that the harm due to the inno-
cent concurring or duplicating cause "almost certainly" would have oc-
curred absent the tortious cause. 109 This defense, according to Wright,
is applicable both to overdetermined harm and to duplicated harm in
which an innocent cause concurs with a tortious cause, or would have
caused duplicated harm previously caused by tortious conduct. 110 He
suggests, in his most recent work, that this is a matter of proximate
cause or limitation on liability,111 although earlier he had adverted to
both proximate cause and damages as the source of this rule.112
Wright believes that this defense is both normatively and descriptively
correct.113
I have considerable sympathy for several aspects of Wright's claim.
First, any such limitation rule must be placed elsewhere than factual
causation. Many of what I have referred to as duplicating causes are
not causes at all; they are preempted by the harm having already oc-
curred or are hypothetical events that in fact never occur, such as
death at a standardized age for the decedent in a wrongful death case.
For reasons I explain below, imposing the burden of proof on the de-
fendant makes good sense. While we generally think of both proxi-
mate cause and damages as prima facie elements of a claim for which
the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, there are instances in which
106. John Fleming sloughed together overdetermined harm and duplicated harm in suggesting
that for the former the innocent cause "be taken into account, if not for the purpose of eliminat-
ing the causal relevance of the other (guilty) factor, at all events of reducing the recoverable
loss." See FLEMING, supra note 64, at 180.
107. Wright, supra note 44, at 1434.
108. Id. at 1436.
109. Id. at 1435.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1450.
112. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.




the burden of proof on a prima facie element is shifted to the
defendant.1 14
This rule could be imposed as a matter of proximate cause or, in the
new vernacular adopted by the Third Restatement, scope of liability.' 1 5
Indeed, there are suggestions in some cases thait proximate cause is
the source of this limitation, but we should not make too much of that
language, which occurred when the term "proximate cause" was used
to mean factual cause, proximate cause, or both. For duplicated harm,
it is more comfortable to address this as a matter of damages (identifi-
cation of the harm), because scope of liability is an all-or-nothing pro-
position and because there is nothing in the law on scope of liability
that appears to address this question and limit the extent of damages
for which a defendant is liable. 116 Placing such a rule in proximate
cause also risks confusion because of the misleading second word of
the phrase and the multiple usages of it. At first glance it might ap-
pear that there is an uncomfortable ring to using damages to eliminate
entirely the liability of a tortfeasor whose conduct concurs with an
innocent cause to produce overdetermined harm. Yet, identification
of harm is, I have suggested, an aspect of determining damages. That
task includes assessing whether an injury is a cognizable harm, as with
the determination of whether a lost chance is a compensable harm.
Thus, I think we can comfortably place this inquiry within the dam-
ages determination.
On the other hand, imposing a burden of proof of virtual certainty,
as Professor Wright suggests, is hard to square with contemporary
civil burdens of proof.117 As explained below, justification for such an
extreme requirement is hard to find, and there is considerable reason
to doubt its existence.
While proof of legally cognizable harm and appropriate evidence to
document its amount is an element of a plaintiff's prima facie claim,
importing some aspects of an affirmative defense-including the bur-
den of pleading, production, and persuasion-to the matter of causes
of overdetermined or duplicated harm would not be unprecedented.
Thus, the burden of raising, which is similar if not equivalent to the
burden of pleading, whether proximate cause exists, is often imposed
on the defendant. That is because proximate cause is rarely an issue
114. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 27 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 2005); see also infra text accompanying notes 118-20.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 29, at 574 special
note on proximate cause (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
116. See generally JOSEPH A. PAGE, TORTS: PROXIMATE CAUSE (2003).
117. But see COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 1995) (requiring party seeking puni-
tive damages to prove entitlement beyond a reasonable doubt).
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in a tort case, and if there is to be an issue about it, the burden is on
the defendant to contend that its existence is in dispute and to provide
some basis for that claim. 1 8 Similarly, we might expect the defendant
who claims that there is duplicated harm that limits its liability to pro-
vide notice to the other parties of that claim.
Moreover, there is reason to impose the burden of production on
the defendant with regard to duplicated or overdetermined harm.
One reason is that proving a negative is quite difficult. To require the
plaintiff to prove that there were no other innocent sufficient causes
of his or her harm and that there are no other innocent causes that
duplicate or might duplicate some of the harm caused by the defen-
dant would be an onerous burden. Requiring the defendant to come
forward with evidence that plausibly reveals the existence of such a
cause is thus attractive.119 A second reason to shift the burden of
proof might be that the defendant is culpable and has harmed the
plaintiff, and if there is to be a decision based on an absence of evi-
dence, the defendant should bear that risk rather than the plaintiff.
That reasoning explains a substantial amount of burden shifting from
plaintiff to defendant in tort law,120 but much of its force is diminished
118. Indeed, treatment of proximate cause in the Second Restatement is couched in terms that
look like an affirmative defense, providing the default that if the tortious conduct is a substantial
factor, then legal cause exists unless "there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability
because of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 431(b) (1965); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 29 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
119. For affirmation of the proposition that the burden is the defendant's, see Stevens v. Ban-
gor & Aroostook Railroad Co., 97 F.3d 594, 599, 601-02 (1st Cir. 1996); Abernathy v. Superior
Hardwoods, Inc., 704 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1983); Hudgins v. Serrano, 453 A.2d 218, 222 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982) (placing on defendant the burden of proving plaintiff's preexisting
condition would occur and duplicate damages in the future); Meyer v. Union R.R. Co., 865 A.2d
857, 866 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004). The concern about proving a negative would not materialize
when the event was one about which there was no dispute. In that event, we might even impose
on the plaintiff the burden of proof with regard to when it would occur. That suggests, for
example, that it is the plaintiffs burden of proof in a wrongful death case to provide appropriate
mortality tables (if they are not admissible through judicial notice) by which to estimate the
extent to which the decedent's death was accelerated. But cf Rober v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 142 N.W.
22, 25 (N.D. 1913) (holding that plaintiff need not introduce mortality tables and determining
that the damage award was not excessive by reference to mortality tables of which the court took
judicial notice). See also Follett v. Jones, 481 S.W.2d 713 (Ark. 1972) (requiring plaintiff to
prove life expectancy of decedent who had lung cancer at the time that defendant caused death
in automobile accident).
120. Indeed, that was precisely the explanation employed in one of the cases on which Profes-
sor Wright relies, Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 915 (Wis. 1927). Kingston
modified an earlier case that is the leading case denying liability to a defendant whose tortious
conduct concurred with a fire of unknown origin to produce the plaintiff's overdetermined harm.
See Cook v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 561 (Wis. 1898). Kingston imposed
the burden of proof on the defendant to prove that the source of a concurring cause was inno-
cent rather than tortious.
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with the advent of comparative responsibility. No longer can we uni-
versally employ the culpable defendant and innocent plaintiff justifi-
cation for shifting the burden of proof.
Let me return to the question of the magnitude of the burden of
persuasion. An "almost-certainly" standard would diminish the role
of innocent causes enormously and the rationale for it is difficult to
find, although Professor Wright musters some support.' 21 Professor
Wright is not entirely clear whether his "almost-certainly" standard
applies to the fact of the innocent force or its timing.
With regard to the likelihood of the event, we know beyond "almost
certainly" that everyone will die. For events that are not physically
preempted and occur before trial, the almost-certainly standard would
also be satisfied. But most events that postdate the trial will be at best
a probabilistic assessment and their timing likely highly variable. Yet
uncertainty about timing may be more salient than the probability of
the event. There is very little discounting for an individual predis-
posed to schizophrenia if the disease would not have occurred until
moments before death. Yet surely we cannot expect the defendant to
prove with any precision when some potential event would have oc-
curred. David Fischer explains the evidence employed to locate the
time of natural death for purposes of determining damages based on
future events that will not occur because they are preempted by the
plaintiff's harm or decedent's death: "In both the cases predicting a
future time of death and the cases predicting future forces that reduce
earning capacity, courts often use speculative evidence."122
Professor Dobbs, who Wright cites, does suggest (with some tenta-
tiveness) that there must be limits to the use of potential future events
that are preempted by the defendant's tortious conduct to reduce the
harm for which the defendant is liable. He provides the hypothetical
example of a car accident that causes the death of a person who was
on her way to a plane that later was blown up by a terrorist.123 His
121. See Wright, supra note 44, at 1435 n.30 (citing DOBBS, supra note 29, § 177, at 434 (quot-
ing Robertson, supra note 13, at 1798 and Fischer, supra note 1, at 1142-43)). Robertson con-
templates a rule that distinguishes future events based on their immediacy and the certainty that
they would occur. Prosser endorses the proposition that the future event must be imminent. See
KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 52, at 321-22. Fleming endorses a "reasonably imminent" re-
quirement, citing Prosser, and also requires that the duplicating cause be in operation at the time
of the defendant's tortious act. See FLEMING, supra note 64, at 181.
122. Fischer, supra note 1, at 1139; see also Morton v. Sw. Tel. & Tel. Co., 217 S.W. 831, 835
(Mo. 1920) ("Of course, as has been said, there can be no absolute certainty as to the duration of
any one's life. The tables are simply evidence for the jury to consider in estimating the damage
to accrue-damage which at best is more or less conjectural.").
123. DOBBS, supra note 29, at 433.
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suggestion seems right, but because the second event was tortious,1 24
we would not reduce damages based on a tortious duplicating cause
for reasons previously discussed.1 25
Professor Dobbs concludes by tentatively suggesting that a limit ar-
ticulated by Professor David Robertson might be appropriate. Rob-
ertson, addressing contingent future events, argues that there is a
difference between a Dillon look-alike (a parachuter whose parachute
failed to open shot while in the air by a hunter) and a decedent killed
by a defendant in a wrongful death case who defends on the basis that
the decedent was about to board an airplane that crashed on take-
off.126 Robertson thinks that the latter claim will not be accepted,
while distinguishing Dillon on grounds of immediacy such that courts
could not honestly ignore the threat to the parachutist of crashing into
the ground, but could live with themselves by ignoring the airplane
that crashed. Robertson implicitly contemplates that the crash is in-
nocent and quotes the Prosser treatise:
There is a clear distinction between a person who is standing in the
path of an avalanche when the defendant shoots to kill, and one
who is about to embark on a steamship doomed later to strike an
iceberg and sink. The life of the latter has value at the time, as any
insurance company would agree, but that of the former has none. 127
Prosser's distinction may merely address the different life expectan-
cies of the decedent at death, but that has nothing to do with immedi-
acy. The more significant distinction returns us to the value theory to
explain damages, and Prosser is correct based on the view that the
future steamship passenger's life would not be discounted because the
future event was not known at the time of the death. Prosser was an
adherent to the value theory, and this passage reveals that view.12 8 At
another level, however, the fact that the future passenger's life had
value at the time of his death does not necessarily contradict reducing
the damages his estate would recover for his death. Yes, there was
some loss because of the premature death, but it was much less than it
would have been if the deceased had chosen a land-based vacation
instead of a cruise. The inability of the value theory to take account of
any risk unknown at the time of the plaintiff's injury but that emerges
124. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
125. The second reason that Professor Dobbs provides is that such limitations run into
problems when the two concurring or duplicative causes are both the result of tortious conduct.
That, of course, does not apply when one of the causes is innocent.
126. See Robertson, supra note 13. I assume that the plane crash was not a result of tortious
conduct; if it were we would be back with Professor Dobbs's case of two tortious causes produc-
ing duplicated harm.




before trial reveals that theory's inability to confront the task at
hand. 129
One additional objection to considering nonimminent contingent
events is raised by Professor King: "The retrospective conjuring up of
events contingent at the time of injury would open the door to absurd
results. Allowing such contingencies to affect valuation would create
a rule that could not be administered.' 30
Professor King appears concerned that such a rule would permit
defendants to employ the "kitchen sink" of contingent possibilities
that might occur in the future, even if they were of a very low
probability. Such a rule would be administratively costly, perhaps
prohibitively so. This concern leads King to propose that before a
future contingency can be considered in determining harm, it must
have, borrowing from Prosser, "attached" at the time harm was immi-
nent.131 Attachment occurs when the sequence of events leading to
the duplicated harm exists, requiring problematical interpretation. 132
King also imports into the imminence standard that the plaintiff could
not take action to avoid the duplicated harm even if fully aware of
it.133
King's concern that leads to his invocation of an imminence re-
quirement, however, appears to be an artifact of the value theory.
With the value theory, all potential future risks, at least those whose
information costs are less than the risks' discounted value, would be
taken into account. Alternatively, he may be concerned that defend-
ants would conjure a plethora of possibilities that might occur.
Neither of these concerns should prevent consideration of contin-
gent events in determining the damages to which a plaintiff is entitled.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 68-69.
130. King, supra note 9, at 1358; see also FLEMING, supra note 64, at 181.
131. See King, supra note 9 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 4, § 52, at 353).
132. Professor King, like Prosser and other commentators, confronts the "doomed steamship"
hypothetical. He concludes that because the conditions for the steamship sinking are not all in
place at the time, along with the fact that the victim, if prescient, could have avoided the prob-
lem (an additional condition he would impose), the hypothetical death of the victim on the
steamship should not affect the damages for which the defendant is liable. I think the steamship
hypothetical, along with the miscarriage cases, is confounded by the fact that, on one view, it
involves a defendant arguing for credit for having conferred a benefit, while on another it merely
involves an innocent, if hypothetical, duplicating cause. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
I do not have an answer for this Janus-like circumstance, but depending on which perspective is
adopted may lead to different outcomes. I do not have an answer for this matter, but recogniz-
ing it as such may assist in attacking it and appreciating why we respond differently when the
source of the innocent cause is not a force or event that the defendant's tort has prevented from
occurring.
133. Professor Fischer has also gently criticized Professor King's claim that the innocent cause
must have "attached" before it can be considered. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 1143-46.
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While the value theory would address any risk that was worth consid-
eration, the requirement that the future events be proved by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence provides sufficient protection from the
administrative costs that concerned Professor King. For a long time
tort law has insisted that plaintiffs recover for all consequences-pre-
sent or future-in a single lawsuit. 34 That requirement has not been
abandoned or modified because of its administrative inefficiencies, 35
and one state's recent move to relax the preponderance standard and
permit damages for future contingent harm based on its probability
suggests a tolerance for greater administrative expense with regard to
future contingent events. 136
With regard to defendants presenting myriad possible future events,
the discipline of their having the burden of proof should obviate that
concern. 137 The risk of parties asserting remote or speculative claims
always exists, but requiring that they provide sufficient evidence to
permit the factfinder to make such a determination provides consider-
able control. So long as proof of future contingencies is required of
defendants by a preponderance of the evidence, we can go a long way
toward easing Professor King's concerns. 138
There are a number of instances in which the law already adjudi-
cates contingent events and employs the preponderance standard as
the burden of proof. Proof of future harm that the plaintiff may suffer
was mentioned above. 139 For plaintiffs who are predisposed to a harm
that is accelerated by the defendant's tortious conduct, courts rou-
tinely permit the jury to consider the predisposition and to reduce
134. See, e.g., Fetter v. Beal, [1697] 91 Eng. Rep. 1122 (K.B.).
135. Asbestos litigation, which involves multiple independent diseases with different latency
periods is a unique exception. See, e.g., Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111,
120-21 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 649 n.3 (Tex. 2000)
(citing cases).
136. Dillon v. Evanston Hosp., 771 N.E.2d 357 (Ill. 2002); see also Pelcha v. United Amuse-
ment Co., 606 P.2d 1168 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (recovery for less than fifty percent probability of
future harm). Canadian law has long permitted a plaintiff to recover damages for the probability
of future injury, even when the probability is less than fifty percent. See Athey v. Leonati, [1997]
140 D.L.R. 235.
137. As Alex Stein made me appreciate, the burden of proof does not work very well when
the issue is one that is continuous, such as time or damages, as opposed to one that is dichoto-
mous. Frequently, the question of the timing of some future event will require resolution for
purposes of determining damages. No specific date can be proved by a preponderance of the
evidence. Consistent with the reasons for placing the burden of proof on defendant, my inclina-
tion is to employ an instruction that tells the jury to resolve doubts about timing in favor of the
plaintiff.
138. Indeed, in the same article that Professor King expressed concern about excessive use of
contingent possibilities being asserted, he recognized that the prevailing rule on proof of those
contingencies is the preponderance standard. See King, supra note 9, at 1370 n.54.
139. See text accompanying notes 134-35.
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damages if it finds that the plaintiff would have suffered the same
harm at a later time.140 Those cases contain no hint of an enhanced
burden of proof, and there is, after all, a "functional identity between
imminent threats and pre-existing conditions. ' 141 Plaintiffs with a la-
tent disease that might cause duplicated harm at some time in the fu-
ture demonstrate a similar and additional instance in which future
contingent events are adjudicated to determine the damages to which
a plaintiff is entitled. 142 Indeed, cases in which plaintiffs who suffer
tortious injury and have a disease that may produce duplicated harm
some time in the future are even less sympathetic cases for discount-
ing damages than the accident victim who avoids the doomed airline
flight because in the latter case, we know the disposition of the dupli-
cating causal possibility, while in the former we can only try to predict
at the time of trial what the future will bring.143
V. CONCLUSION
The matter of duplicated harm must be a matter of harm identifica-
tion and not factual causation. Much of what counts as duplicated
harm in determining the damages that a plaintiff can recover occurs
without the duplicating "cause" ever taking place and actually causing
any harm, either because the harm is preempted or the cause is a
140. See Stevens v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 97 F.3d 594, 599 (1st Cir. 1996); Stoleson v.
United States, 708 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1983) (imposing burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove
extent to which her harm would have occurred due to preexisting condition if tortious conduct
had not occurred); Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1174 (2d Cir. 1970) (permitting
defendant to provide evidence that plaintiff's preexisting condition would duplicate her harm
some time in the future even though "exact prediction of [the plaintiff's] future apart from the
accident is difficult or even impossible"); Meyer v. Union R.R. Co., 865 A.2d 857 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004). One commentator characterizes the process as a "blank guess about the future." Ulrich
Wagner, Successive Causes and the Quantum of Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 10 OsGOODE
HALL L.J. 369, 375 (1972).
In Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 773 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1985), Judge Posner
asserted that damages should be reduced by the probability that the plaintiff would have suf-
fered the disease in the absence of the defendant's precipitation of it. This is consistent with
Judge Posner's advocacy for employing probabilities, even those less than fifty percent, in deter-
mining aspects of liability and damages. The discounting provided in Lancaster fails to account
for the fact that the defendant also caused an acceleration of the disease and that for, at least
some portion of time, the plaintiff should recover full damages for the consequences of his
disease.
141. Robertson, supra note 13, at 1798 n.162; see also Meyer, 865 A.2d at 863 (comparing
principle of apportionment for preexisting conditions with apportionment adopted in Dillon v.
Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 163 A. 111 (N.H. 1932)).
142. See Victorson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 234 N.W.2d 332 (Wis. 1975);
Jobling v. Associated Dairies Ltd. [1982] A.C. 794 (H.L.).
143. The fact that the duplicating cause in one is a disease or other physical attribute of the
plaintiff while in the other it is an exogenous event, whether manmade or an act of God, might
cut the other way, but I do not see a reason why that should be so.
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purely hypothetical one that never actually occurs. Taking those no-
noccurrences into account in awarding damages, thus, must be
grounded in something other than the matter of factual causation. I
take considerable satisfaction from this conclusion and that I was cor-
rect in my debate with Bill about the proper source for these rules,
although it remains to be seen if he will be persuaded. When the ALI
undertakes a project on damages for the Third Restatement of Torts,
this issue is one squarely within the scope of that subject.
Yet my satisfaction is considerably tempered by the recognition that
on another matter on which we debated-the proper treatment of
overdetermined harms when one cause is of innocent origin-Bill was
right, and I failed to see the forest for the trees.1 44 Multiple sufficient
causes are, after all, causes, regardless of whether they are of tortious
or innocent origin. That they are causes, however, does not mean that
liability exists. The first two Restatements unfortunately failed to rec-
ognize this and led a number of courts (and me) astray.
Comparing treatment of duplicated harm reveals the difficulty with
the first two Restatements' treatment of concurring tortious and inno-
cent causes. Imposing liability on the tortfeasor whose act concurs
with an innocent sufficient force just cannot be reconciled with the
way in which we treat the far more common phenomenon of dupli-
cated harm. Perhaps they were led to that error by the fact that differ-
ent reporters for each of the first two Restatements were responsible
for the causation and damages provisions. The rule on concurring in-
nocent and tortious causes in the first two Restatements was produced
by reporters who did not draft and, I presume, did not have the oppor-
tunity to consider the disquieting tension that damages law presents
for their resolution of concurring innocent and tortious causes. 145
I am grateful for the opportunity provided by this Symposium on
damages to consider damages law and its intersection with causation.
May I also express my relief at not concluding myself outside the sub-
ject matter of this Symposium?
144. Actually, a split decision with Bill on these two matters is far better than my overall
average with him.
145. As this article is going to press, we hope to persuade the ALI to permit us to amend the
current treatment of innocent and tortious concurring causes in the Third Restatement to provide
the necessary room for a future project on damages to speak to the question of whether any
damages are recoverable in such a situation.
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